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CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Rebecca Ingber*
Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress
and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress
and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter,
even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense
power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.
And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency,
presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually
“wins” in foreign affairs does not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses
to take is preordained. Questions of foreign policy and national security engage diverse
components of the executive branch bureaucracy, which have overlapping jurisdictions and
often conflicting biases and priorities. And yet they must arrive at one executive branch
position. Thus the process of decisionmaking, the weight accorded the position of any
given decisionmaker, the context in which the decision is made—together these shape the
ultimate position the President takes.
This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress can—and does—
play in structuring and rearranging the relative powers of those internal actors, and the
processes they take to reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the
President’s ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance, Congress
has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may influence the policy directions
of the presidency by manipulating its internal workings. There are risks to deploying
“process controls,” as I term these measures, in lieu of direct substantive engagement, but
I argue that Congress can and should use these tools more instrumentally to influence the
course of foreign policy in areas where it is otherwise unlikely to assert itself as a coequal
branch and necessary check on presidential power.

* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and Senior Fellow, Reiss
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Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable, and faculty workshops at BU, Hastings, and
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INTRODUCTION
Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power
between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever
the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is
well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord
between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he
acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.
But presidential primacy is not the end of the story. While the
President might wield far-reaching control over the nation’s foreign affairs
and national security policies, Congress can shape the President’s position,
and thus the foreign policy of the United States, without necessarily
mandating the substance of that policy itself.
This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress
can—and does—play through structuring and rearranging the relative
powers of internal executive branch actors, and the processes they take to
reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President’s
ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance,
Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may
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influence the policy directions of the presidency simply by manipulating its
internal workings.
A recent example illustrates the point. In 2017, the newly-elected
President threatened a trade war with China, Mexico, Canada and other
longtime allies and competitors around the globe, proposing high tariffs on
imports of steel, and specific products such as foreign-made vehicles.1 His
own political party controlled the House and Senate, but there was little
appetite in Congress for raising tariffs. So he turned inward, looking to his
own cabinet to effectuate his plans. Government lawyers dusted off a
rarely-used delegation from Congress, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, which permits the President to adjust restrictions on imports
when the Secretary of Commerce finds that they impose a threat to national
security.2
With his statutory authority contingent upon meeting this procedural
requirement, the President demanded that the Commerce Secretary
consider the effects on national security of steel and aluminum imports,
asserting meanwhile, in an expansive interpretation of this statutory
exception, that the nation’s economic welfare is itself a matter of national
security.3 The Secretary of Commerce, following the statute’s requirements,
consulted with the Secretary of Defense, who told him, in a diplomaticallyworded missive, that the adjustments proposed by Commerce were in fact
unnecessary for national security, and could have negative consequences for
U.S. relationships with important allies.4 Those steps taken, and despite the
Defense Secretary’s warning, the President moved ahead on the Commerce

1 The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
(2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20%20The%20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Trump’s Trade
War
May
Have
Already
Begun,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/economy/trumps-mexico-china-tariff-trade.html;
Bob Bryan & Elena Holodny, Trump’s Considering a Tariff that Could Put the Economy on a Path to ‘Global
Recession,’ BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 30, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpsteel-tariff-china-germany-japan-global-recession-2017-6.
2 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)-(c) (2018). Prior to the Trump Presidency, Presidential authority to
impose tariffs had only been exercised a total of five times across the authority’s sixty-three-year
existence. Cong. Research Serv., RL45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for
Congress Appendix B (2018).
3 Presidential
Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce, (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-commerce/;
Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security, (Apr. 20, 2017)
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-201700259.pdf.
4 Letter from James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of
Commerce,
(2018)
(on
file
with
author),
originally
found
at
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_t
o_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf.

Draft September 18, 2019

2

Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs

Secretary’s report, imposing additional tariffs on both steel and aluminum
imports.5
Members of the President’s own party in Congress issued unusual
rebukes of the President’s action, denouncing the measures as a “tax hike
on American manufacturers, workers and consumers,” 6 and asked the
President to dial back the global tariffs.7 They did not, however, exercise
their power to withdraw the President’s authority to adjust imports, an
authority that Congress itself had given to the President through
increasingly expansive delegations since the 1930s.8
Yet congressional reticence to reassert dominance over trade policy is
not the end of the story. There is another tool of control that members of
Congress yet seek to deploy and which, despite increasingly relinquishing
power to the President, Congress has used several times before in order to
influence the direction of U.S. trade policy. And that is to restructure the
decisionmaking process inside the executive branch in order to preference
decisionmakers and processes more likely to favor their preferred
outcomes.
Indeed, members of Congress have introduced several bills seeking to
do just that. In 2018 and 2019, several bipartisan groups of lawmakers
introduced bills in both the House and Senate to retract from the Secretary
of Commerce the power to invoke a national security justification for
raising tariffs on foreign imports.9 The bills would grant that power instead
to the Secretary of Defense—the very cabinet secretary who had, the bill
proponents surely noticed, criticized the Commerce Secretary’s proposed
indiscriminate tariffs.10 Such micro-management over the executive branch
decisionmaker is not an untested tool for Congress. In fact, the bills would

5 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
(November 21, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45249.pdf. The President also negotiated
exceptions on a country-by-country basis. Id.
6 Chairman Orrin Hatch, Statement on Steel, Aluminum Tariffs (March 8, 2018) (available at:
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-steel-aluminum-tariffs).
7 Vicki Needham, Ways and Means Sets Hearing on Trump’s Tariffs, THE HILL (Apr. 5, 2018, 5:17
PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/381875-ways-and-means-set-hearing-on-trumps-tariffs.
8 See infra II.C.2 (detailing historical development of the national security justification for
imposing tariffs).
9 H.R. 6923, 115th Cong. § 4 (2018); S. 3329, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018); Trade Security Act of
2019, S. 365, 116th Cong. (2019); Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 287,
116th Cong (2019).
10 See supra note 4. Former Defense Secretary Mattis resigned between the 2018 and 2019 bill
proposals, but press releases accompanying the 2019 proposals, such as one stating the purpose was
to counter “misuse” of the national security justification and “to ensure that the statute is used for
genuine national security purposes,” suggest that bill proponents view the Defense Department’s
constraining effect on the use of the national security justification as departmental, rather than
unique to Mattis. See Press Release, Portman, Jones, Ernst, Alexander, Feinstein, Fischer, Sinema & Young
Introduce Trade Security Act to Reform National Security Tariff Process (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-jones-ernst-alexanderfeinstein-fischer-sinema-young-introduce
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make the Office of the Defense Secretary at least the sixth distinct
congressionally-designated executive branch office to wield that authority
since Congress began delegating away its power over the nation’s trade
policy.11
Why might members of Congress who want to challenge the
President’s trade policies deploy an indirect tool of micro-management over
the executive branch’s decisionmaking process, rather than simply direct
the policy themselves through substantive legislation? And could such an
indirect tool have any real effect?
In fact, indirect tools such as the choice of executive branch
decisionmaker or the restructuring of internal decisionmaking processes can
entirely redirect the President’s policy outcomes, and members of Congress
often have reason to prefer these mechanisms to more direct legislation.
Thus, while Congress may defer or even delegate to the President on
matters of substantive foreign policy—and while members of Congress
may not rest assured that the President will implement their will even when
they do mandate substance—Congress may nevertheless shape the nation’s
foreign policy through what I term “congressional administration.”12
Congressional administration, as I define it here, is the management and
manipulation of internal executive branch decisionmaking processes for the
purpose of advancing a substantive agenda. Congress has an array of
measures that it may deploy to influence the nation’s foreign policy, short
of mandating the substance itself. These “process controls” include
familiar tools such as agency design and procedural requirements, but they
also include the designation and reassignment of decisionmaker within the
executive branch. Each of these may be deployed for different purposes,
with different effects and risks, and each has significant effects on the
ultimate policy direction the United States takes.
This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature,
one on congressional-executive turf wars over foreign affairs and national
security, and one on agency design and political control over the

11 See generally Edward E. Groves, A Brief History of the 1988 National Security Amendments, 20 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 589 (1989). The executive agents who have been tasked with fulfilling the
requirements of Section 232 include: Director of Defense Mobilization (1955), Director of the
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (1958), Director of the Office of Emergency Planning
(1962), Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (1968), Secretary of the Treasury (1974),
and Secretary of Commerce (1979).
12 I use this term as a congressional corollary to then-Professor Elena Kagan’s “presidential
administration,” which she identified as presidential control of the bureaucracy as a means to
advance “the President's own policy and political agenda,” particularly in the face of political
obstacles to doing so through other means. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2011). Jack Beermann uses this term directly, to describe Congress’s ongoing
involvement in the “day-to-day administration of the law.” See Jack Beermann, Congressional
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006).

Draft September 18, 2019

4

Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs

bureaucracy. Scholars have long debated the proper constitutional
allocation of power between the President and Congress over the direction
of the nation’s foreign policy. As a practical matter, however, the
conventional wisdom holds that “the President (almost) always wins in
foreign affairs.” 13 The reasons for presidential primacy are legion:
institutional competence; asymmetrical expertise and information; more
costs than benefits to Congress in engaging. Moreover, many argue that
even when Congress does engage directly and substantively on a matter, the
President often manages to assert authority to act, either by interpreting his
statutory authorities broadly, 14 or by establishing his constitutional
prerogative to act unilaterally,15 or even by skirting the legal constraints
altogether.16
But the fact that the President usually “wins” vis-à-vis Congress does
not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses to take is
preordained. Nor does it mean that the policy the President ultimately
adopts at the end of a long winding process is the one he would have
chosen if all of the options were simply laid out before him at the outset.
In fact, presidential primacy does not even mean that the policy the
President ultimately adopts has actually received the personal sign-off of the
President.
Indeed there is another dynamic beyond that of the President-Congress
relationship that is essential to understanding foreign policy positioning and
is as much of a hotbed for diversity of opinion. This is the multi-faceted,
many-headed organism that is the executive branch bureaucracy. That
there is a diversity of opinion within the executive branch, especially on
matters of foreign policy and national security, should be clear these days to
anyone who picks up a newspaper.17 That the process for decisionmaking
inside the executive branch influences the resulting policies is perhaps less
intuitive, particularly to those who envision a unitary executive headed by a
willful President with his fingers in every pot. And yet it is so.
Furthermore, there exist opportunities for influencing these processes, and

13 Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra
Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988);See also, Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, 4 TRANS-ACTION 7
(1966).
14 See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, D.C.) (available at
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062811_Transcript_Libya%20and%20War%20Po
wers.pdf). See also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009)
(arguing that administrative law is sufficiently vague to enable Presidents to act without constraint at
the invocation of emergency, and that this is inevitable).
15 See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
16 For a bit of all three, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), (available at:
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download).
17 Or, if this is anachronistic, then to anyone who is on Twitter.
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thus the resulting policy, from the outside. Of specific relevance here,
Congress has robust means at its disposal to shape these processes and thus
the resulting decision.
I have written previously about the multiplicity of decisionmakers,
processes, overlapping interests, and conflicting proclivities inside the
executive branch, and the potential for external actors to shape the
President’s positions by triggering different decisionmaking pathways.18 I
focused in prior work on the role of litigants, NGOs, and international
treaty bodies in prompting different processes and the potential for
achieving different outcomes.19 But members of Congress have far greater
opportunities than most for triggering and even for restructuring different
decisionmaking pathways, including for designating their preferred internal
official as the decider over a given matter.
While executive branch decisionmaking may at times appear opaque
from the outside—particularly in the realm of foreign policy and national
security—savvy government watchers, scholars, and even members of
Congress can often glean a sense of its inner workings: which matters are
subject to internal debate, who within the administration may be inclined
toward particular policies, and where the pressure points lie for
decisionmaking.20 Actors inclined to lean into these pressure points may
therefore find they can influence policy outcomes simply by exerting
influence on the shape of executive branch decisionmaking.
Members of Congress have especially potent tools for shaping the
process of decisionmaking, through legislation directly creating procedural
requirements or designating decisionmakers, as well as through “soft”
mechanisms such as requests for testimony from particular executive
branch officials,21 all of which can shape and shift presidential priorities,
force to a head executive branch decisions, exacerbate internal tensions, or
place a thumb on the scale in favor of a particular set of actors engaged in
intra-executive branch conflict. Through the use of these process controls,
Congress can and does shape the process of executive branch
decisionmaking and influence policy without necessarily mandating a
particular substantive outcome.

18 Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1531 (2017).
19 Id.
20 In fact, members of Congress often have significant ties to the executive branch both
through their own personal relationship to members of the political class within the administration,
and through staffers’ often deep connections to agencies, through prior positions, former colleagues,
and the fact that they are repeat players on specific issues. See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Statutory
International Law, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 263, 296-297 (2018).
21 See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017) (arguing that Congress has many tools both “hard” like
appropriations and “soft” like speech, which it underutilizes).

Draft September 18, 2019

6

Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs

This Article proceeds as follows: Part I first considers scholarly debates
over the legal and practical allocation of the foreign affairs power, including
the extent to which Congress is able effectively to constrain the President in
this sphere. Acknowledging the practical reality of presidential primacy in
matters of foreign affairs, it turns to scholarship considering the interaction
of Congress with the internal workings of the executive branch
bureaucracy. This scholarship largely brackets off the fields of foreign
policy and national security; thus bringing insights from administrative law
and political science scholarship on political control of the bureaucracy to
bear on debates about the allocation of foreign policy power is one
contribution of this Article.
Part II introduces and classifies what I term “process controls,” the
mechanisms that Congress may deploy to influence the executive branch
decisionmaking process, and through it, the shape of foreign policy. Two
types of measures that I include within the term process controls—agency
design and the imposition of administrative procedures—have been the
subject of significant scholarship in both administrative law and political
science.22 I therefore consider these each in turn here in order to examine
their relevance and influence on questions of foreign policy and national
security, which are generally excluded from scholarship over agency design
and administrative procedure.
I devote the majority of this Part, and of the Article, to identifying and
analyzing a specific type of process control that has not been the focus of
scholarship: the designation of executive branch decisionmaker. Among
the controls I discuss in this Article, Congress wields significant, targeted
control over decisionmaking inside the executive branch simply through its
choice of intra-executive decider. This is not a one-off decision; Congress
may—and does—reassign the decisionmaker as new events arise or policy
preferences shift. Members of Congress thus may seek to shift a delegation
of authority horizontally, from one executive branch official or office to
another who may espouse policy preferences more in sync with their own.
Or they may allocate power vertically, such as upward toward a high-level
official, if they are looking to increase political accountability for a decision,
or downward to professionals and technocrats, when seeking to buffer an
issue from partisan politics. Or they may try to diffuse power, perhaps as a
means of constraining government action, for example by requiring
consultation among or even certification by several different officials.
Part III considers the implications of Congress turning to process
controls to shape foreign policy. It considers when and why Congress
might turn to process controls over more direct efforts to mandate
substance, and which particular process controls are likely to be effective at

22

See infra Part I.
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implementing particular purposes. This Part also probes the unique
constitutional questions raised by congressional administration of foreign
policy, as well as the risks at stake—risks to good government and to
accountability for decisionmaking.
In considering the influence of internal decisionmakers and processes
on executive branch policy, and Congress’s ability to influence its direction
through these processes, this Article also adds texture to debates about a
“unitary executive” model of executive branch decisionmaking. I discuss
the implications of process controls for formal doctrine and the potential
for judicial review in Part III. But the influence of process controls on
policy I discuss in this paper more broadly provides a functional critique of
unitary executive theory. Wherever the line ultimately falls on the formal
powers of the President over those within the executive branch, the
multiplicity of decisionmakers and processes will always provide practical
opportunities for influencing and even manipulating executive branch
policies, from within the executive branch and without.
Congress has ceded significant ground to the President on matters of
foreign policy and national security, and continues to do so, often
abdicating its responsibility to craft policy or to provide substantive,
rigorous oversight. Moreover, Congress has at times lost ground to the
President even when it has attempted to assert its prerogative.23 But this
Article nevertheless challenges views of the presidency as completely
untethered to law or to congressional constraint. Congress may be overly
timid in this space, and it may at times be ineffective, but it can and does
exercise its power to shape foreign policy short of mandating substance,
and it could deploy these process controls even more instrumentally to
impel decisionmaking in its preferred direction.
I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER AND BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS
This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature,
one on congressional-executive power struggles over foreign affairs and
national security, and one on agency design and political control over the
bureaucracy.
A.

Congressional-Executive Allocations of Foreign Affairs Power

It has long been conventional wisdom that the President exercises
significantly more control over foreign affairs than does Congress. As a
matter of constitutional authority, scholars continue to debate the proper

23

See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076.
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allocation of foreign affairs power between the President and Congress.24
And yet as a practical matter, the question quite rarely comes to a head.25
This is not for lack of possible flashpoints, but rather because Congress
rarely deploys all the power it clearly holds, let alone tries to push the
envelope. In fact, Congress has a wide range of methods at its disposal for
exercising direct authority over foreign affairs well within its explicitly
allocated authority—from committee oversight to appropriations to
declarations of war.26 Yet members of Congress have often been reticent to
use this power, for reasons both practical and political, and Congress’s
formal authority generally well exceeds its functional willingness to deploy
it. To the extent that longstanding practice affects the balance of powers
among the branches, this acquiescence by Congress in the executive’s
stranglehold on foreign affairs may even result in a formal shift in power
over time to the executive.27
The reasons for congressional reticence to get involved in foreign
policy are overdetermined.28 Some are based in rational justifications like
institutional competence and good government. Much of the foreign
affairs and national security expertise is now housed in the executive
branch, and thus some level of deference to their more granular knowledge
may be justified.29 Exponential increases in complexity and classification
lead to significant information asymmetries between the branches.30 And to
the extent it is advantageous that the state speak with “one voice” on the
international plane, the President is the likeliest option for holding that
mantle.31 Some reasons are practical: collective action takes time, and the

24 Compare Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
111 YALE L.J. (2001), with Julian Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative,
COLUM. L. REV. (manuscript at 119) (Forthcoming, 2019) (on file with author).
25 A recent notable exception is the case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in which the State Department
refused to implement a statutory requirement that passports for individuals born in Jerusalem list the
place of birth as “Israel.” The Supreme Court heard the case and held that the statutory requirement
impermissibly infringed on the President’s plenary power over recognition of foreign governments.
See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076.
26 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
27 See, e.g., Curtis Bradley & Trevor Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
28 See, e.g., Wildavsky, supra note 13 (arguing that, among other reasons, foreign policy engages
fewer clear partisan preferences than domestic matters, requires expertise the public does not tend to
have, and thus Congress tends to cede to the President a freer hand on such matters).
29 Terry Moe & William Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 Pres. Stud.
Quart., at 855-56 (1999).
30 Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of Presidential
Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002).
31 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 42 (1996) (“That the
President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been
questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.”); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L.
Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1258 (2018). But see
Kristen Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 CHI. L. REV. 609 (discussing
the under-theorized reality of congressional communication with foreign nations).
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President is considered to be at least relatively “unitary” and thus can act
with dispatch that the other branches do not enjoy.32 Moreover, while
members of Congress have many tools at their disposal, including the
power of the purse, they do not themselves command militaries.33 But,
Congress being Congress, the most significant reason for congressional
listlessness in foreign affairs is likely the political one. Most members of
Congress have likely determined that the political costs to engaging in
foreign policy are not worth the political benefits, and tend to engage in this
arena only when they are.34
All of this is, of course, a matter of intense scholarly discussion and
disagreement. In addition to disagreement over whether Congress has
abdicated its authority over foreign affairs, and whether the President has
wrongfully aggrandized his power, scholars have also questioned the extent
to which Congress even can rein in the President when it tries to.35 Many
scholars have rightly noted the difficulties Congress faces in changing the
President’s course of action in the foreign affairs and national security space
even when it chooses to legislate constraints. 36 These concerns are
compounded by other public law scholarship questioning the extent to
which the President is bound by law generally.37
Debates over the foreign affairs power focus primarily on questions of
authority over substance: which body is charged with making major policy
decisions about a given question of foreign relations or national security?
On that metric, the President does “win” most (even almost all) of the
time, at least as a functional matter, even when the Constitution explicitly
grants Congress the authority in question.38 This is so for many reasons—
among them information asymmetries; the ability to act with dispatch; the
ability to act at all; Congress’s cost-benefit analysis about the political value
of intervening in foreign affairs.39

32 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 27, at 438-44 (discussing structural and political
impediments to congressional action).
33 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1818 (1996) (discussing
the President’s longstanding unilateralism in entering war as one reason for presidential dominance)
34 For an account of when Congress is more likely to engage, specifically on war powers, see
WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS
ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS, 33-49 (2007).
35 Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, supra note 14.
36 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
(2006); Koh, supra note 13.
37 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).
38 See Koh, supra note 13. Authorities the Constitution delegates directly to Congress, which
Congress has then either handed over to the President or largely acquiesced in his encroachment,
include the power to declare war and the power to regulate international commerce.
39 See, e.g, id.; Wildavsky, supra note 13.
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Yet presidential primacy is not the end of the story. That the President
can ultimately act does not tell us what the President’s course of action will
be. Particularly in the foreign affairs realm where novel questions often
arise and policy preferences do not necessarily divide neatly along partisan
lines, 40 there is often significant room for disagreement even inside the
executive branch over what action or policy the President should adopt.
And to bring this full circle, Congress has means at its disposal to pressure
and shape the nature of those internal debates and decisionmaking
processes.
This is where the foreign affairs debate could benefit from the literature
on congressional control over the bureaucracy, which I explore in the
section that follows. Both together inform deeper consideration of the
multiplicity of ways actors outside the executive branch, including
Congress, shape Presidents’ actions and policies, as I explore in this Article.
B.

Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy

There are extensive literatures in both political science and public law
scholarship on Congress’s interest and efficacy in reining in and otherwise
controlling the federal bureaucracy. Much of this literature focuses on
domestic matters and often even explicitly brackets off the foreign affairs
or national security bureaucracy.41 Yet despite the possibly exceptionalist
nature of foreign affairs and national security, many of the dynamics that
scholarship on bureaucracy considers have relevance for these fields as well.
As I explain below, these literatures provide an important jumping off point
for considering Congress’s role in influencing executive branch foreign
affairs process and policy.
As in the foreign policy space, scholars of congressional-executive
relations generally have long reckoned with, bemoaned, or defended what
has appeared to be congressional abdication to the President of greater and
greater power. With the rise of the administrative state and the
concomitant complexity of modern governance, Congress has increasingly
moved from narrow delegations of power to the President to broad
delegations that created a significant sphere of discretion within which
bureaucrats could act.42 One debate in modern scholarship considers the
extent to which the result of these broad delegations is an entirely
unconstrained, all-powerful President; among those who push this

Wildavsky, supra note 13.
Some notable exceptions to this gap include: AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999); and Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 California Law Review 1655
(2006)(analyzing the efficacy and ideal structure of agency design for optimal national security
outcomes in the wake of 9/11).
42 Kagan, supra note 12, at 2253-54.
40
41
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“executive unbound” version of the presidency, there are many who warn
of its dangers, and others who view it as essentially a good state of affairs.43
Others argue that the presidency is not, as an empirical matter, entirely
unconstrained. Scholars have pointed to legislative attempts to rein in the
President with substantive law, and the effectiveness of those efforts, even
in areas like national security and war where the conventional wisdom says
the President has enormous leeway.44 They have noted that even when
Congress fails to legislate, there are a number of other tools it has at its
disposal for making its interests known and influential.45 And there is a
significant body of scholarship examining the extent to which Congress
influences bureaucratic choices through its control over the design of
agencies structure of decisionmaking, rather than through substantive
legislation.46
Scholars have considered the extent to which Congress engages in “ex
ante” controls, like agency design, and “ongoing” controls, like oversight, as
a means of managing the bureaucracy, though they debate the purpose of
these controls.47 Some propose that Congress chooses agency design to
ensure that agencies hue to their statutory mandate, to, in effect, “hardwire”
them in order reduce “bureaucratic drift.” 48 Others maintain that
politicians design agencies primarily with policy preferences and political
purposes in mind, which may connect indirectly to efficiency and good
governance to the extent voters are informed on these matters.49 This
literature intersects with debates on the extent to which congressional

43 Compare, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY (2006), with POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 37.
44 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11
(2012).
45 See CHAFETZ, supra note 21.
46 Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
47 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999).
48 Jonathan Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative
Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 671-72 (“The goal of Congress is to ensure that administrative agencies
generate outcomes that are consistent with the original understanding that existed between Congress
and the various interest groups that were parties to the initial political compromise”); Jonathan
Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 92 J.L. ECON. & ORG., at 93
(“politicians who establish administrative agencies can manipulate the structure and design of those
agencies in ways that reduce the chance that future changes in the political landscape will upset the
terms of the original understanding among the relevant political actors”).
49 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES BUREAUCRACY, 3, 161-162 (1997) (“calculations about the ‘proper’ design of
administrative agencies are shaped less by concerns for efficiency or effectiveness than by concerns
about reelection, political control, and ultimately, policy outcomes”); Terry Moe, The Politics of
Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1989) (“American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. [It] arises out of politics,
and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political
power.”).
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attempts at control have any real effect on bureaucratic outcomes, whatever
their purpose.50
Even scholars who do not necessarily see Congress as providing
significant constraints on the executive have pointed to other constraints
that rein in Presidential prerogative. A burgeoning literature has developed
exploring the role of bureaucratic, or administrative, constraints, reining in
the President from inside the executive branch.51 But there is work yet to
be done in considering the extent to which congressional process controls
on agency structure and design interact with these constraints on the
President from inside the executive branch.52
As I have explored in prior work, bureaucratic constraints on the
President can play a significant role in shaping the process and outcome of
executive branch decisionmaking, 53 but they are created, bolstered—and
can ultimately be undermined by—political sources like Congress and the
President himself. Beyond agency design, Congress has numerous “hard”
and “soft” tools at its disposal for structuring and restructuring the process
of decisionmaking inside the executive.54 And it deploys these tools for

50

Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 YALE L.J. 1002

(2017).
51 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term — Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2017); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015); Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, 115 YALE
L.J. 2314 (2006); Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of
Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688
(2011); Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 101
(2018).
52 Political scientist James Lindsay, who has written extensively on congressional involvement in
foreign policymaking, is one of the rare scholars to consider the role of congressional influence on
process in the executive branch’s foreign policy decision-making space. In his view, scholarship has
“underestimated” congressional influence on foreign policy in part because “[p]olitical scientists
[were] slow to recognize how process shapes policy.” See James M. Lindsay, Congress and Foreign
Policy: Why the Hill Matters, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4, 607-628 (1992-1993)
(discussing the influence of “[s]tructural and procedural innovations” on policy, but noting that the
efficacy of these innovations is difficult to answer due to the “understudied” and “slippery” nature of
the subject, which involves “anticipated reactions and counterfactuals.”) See also James M. Lindsay
and Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy, in JAMES M. LINDSAY AND
RANDALL B. RIPLEY, CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL
(1993). Lindsay and Ripley catalog five different types of what they call “procedural legislation,”
including variations of agency design, reporting and certification requirements, and “enfranchis[ing]
new groups in the decision-making process.” Id. at 28-30. Lindsay and Ripley do not examine the
designation of or shift in executive branch decisionmaker as a targeted tool of congressional control,
but each of these statutory mechanisms they discuss might be deployed as a means of designating or
changing the decider over a particular policy matter, as I explore in Part II.
53 Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that Entrench Executive Power,
110 AM. J. INT’L L. 680 (2016); Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts, supra note 18; Ingber, Bureaucratic
Resistance, supra note 51.
54 I borrow here the terms “hard” and soft” as applied to congressional power from Josh
Chafetz, who in turn borrowed them from international relations theory. See CHAFETZ, supra note 45
(describing two forms of congressional power: hard power to “coerce,” such as the power of the
purse, and other “soft” tools such as internal rules of discipline and proceedings.)
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purposes in addition to, and beyond that of, bureaucratic responsiveness to
political pressure alone, as I explore in this Article.
The foreign policy and national security spaces provide an especially
valuable lens for considering this interaction between Congress and
bureaucratic constraints, as there are numerous conflicting interests inside
the executive branch foreign policy and national security infrastructure,
with overlapping jurisdictions, and thus many levers to push and pull to
influence decisionmaking. Moreover, novel issues arise or boil over at a
higher rate than in the purely domestic policy realm, providing new
“opportunity windows” for Congress and the President to consider matters
with fresh eyes.55
Drawing on these literatures, this Article considers a range of
mechanisms through which Congress shapes executive branch
decisionmaking and thus the path of U.S. foreign policy. I focus in
particular on a set of process controls that are not theorized in scholarship
on the administrative state—the choice of internal executive branch
decisionmaker—and consider the purposes, efficacy, and risks of this tool
of congressional administration over the nation’s foreign policy. Though
the focus here is on foreign policy and national security decisionmaking,
this consideration of process controls has relevance beyond these spheres,
to still-nascent questions of how Congress interacts with the levers and
pulleys effectuating decisions inside the executive branch.
II. PROCESS CONTROLS AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY
As I describe in Part I, Congress has, for a range of reasons, fallen short
in the foreign affairs arena. Whether it holds a significant body of formal
power that it refuses to use, or is in fact formally impotent in this sphere,
there is general agreement on this: Congress does not aggressively legislate a
substantive foreign policy agenda, and it certainly does not do so at the
expense of its domestic interests. This Part demonstrates, however, that
even as Congress often declines to pursue a substantive foreign policy
agenda directly, it can and does pursue an array of “process controls” to
influence the conduct of foreign affairs short of directing which positions
the President should adopt.
I use the term “process controls” here to encompass a range of
mechanisms Congress might deploy to manage executive branch
decisionmaking. These include agency design and administrative procedure
requirements, as well as less familiar mechanisms like switching the

55 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2003); RIVALS
POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS (James A. Thurber & Jordan Tama eds.,
6th ed. 2017) (noting the differences between foreign and domestic policy as a matter of partisan
divide); Wildavsky, supra note 13.

FOR
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decisionmaker inside the executive branch. Process controls permit
members of Congress to influence the process and direction of executive
branch decisionmaking indirectly, often with a light touch, avoiding many
of the pitfalls and political costs members may fear would arise from more
direct engagement in foreign policymaking. Moreover, process controls
may even at times be more effective than direct substantive legislation;
while executive branch officials might seek to interpret their way out of
more substantive legislative constraints in order to protect presidential
power, process controls commandeer executive branch officials and
processes themselves to serve as internal constraints on the President.56
Scholarship on the effects of agency design and administrative
procedure tends to focus on “political control” over the bureaucracy, a
term used to refer to the responsiveness and accountability of bureaucratic
actors to politicians, be they in Congress or the Oval Office.57 Does the
bureaucracy, in so many words, continue to make decisions that those
political actors who empowered them would want them to take? Yet
process controls can be animated by multiple purposes, beyond policy
preference. At times, in fact, the precise purpose for which members of
Congress may propose or support a particular mechanism is to remove
decisions from political control, and specifically from the intransigence of
partisan politics.
The choice of process control often connects to the reason members of
Congress may have for choosing this tool over another, more direct form
of policy engagement. Measures aimed at removing decisions from partisan
politics, for example, may be deployed if members of Congress believe it is
important to act on a particular matter, but that political sensitivities stand
in the way of action unless they give the matter to technocrats.58 Creating
decisionmaking pathways inside the executive branch allows members to
shift the political burden off of their shoulders and on to technocrats who
are free of such constraints.59 At other times, by contrast, members may
have specific policy preferences, but be reticent to act because of high
political costs; they may see deploying process controls as a way to
effectuate or at least approximate their preferences while shifting the cost
burden. Even when their goal is a preferred policy objective, members may
believe they can more effectively implement that policy through the use of
these measures. They may even choose these tools over more direct
substantive legislation mandating a particular policy for reasons of good

See Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51.
See, e.g., DAVID LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL
AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008); Max Weber, Bureaucracy in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY (1946); Berry & Gersen, supra note 50.
58 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 47 (discussion of base closures).
59 Id.
56
57
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government, because they actually believe that the executive branch holds
the upper hand on questions of expertise, or information, or ability, and yet
nevertheless have views on improving the process to effectuate better
policies. And of course, as Congress is itself anything but a monolith, any
given measure that Congress implements may be driven forward by
multiple motivations, varying among the members who propose and
support it.60
This Part seeks to classify these different process controls according to
their form and function. I first address two forms of congressional control
over the bureaucracy that have been the subject of significant political
science and administrative law scholarship—agency design and
administrative procedure requirements—to consider how these measures
are and can be deployed as tools of foreign policy. But the focus of this
Part is the dissection of what I term “designated deciders”: measures that
shift the decisionmaker horizontally, such as from one agency head to
another; or vertically, upward toward a cabinet official, or downward
toward a technocrat; measures that excise responsibility and place it in a
new body, at a distance removed from existing decisionmakers; and
measures that diffuse responsibility among several decisionmakers inside
the executive branch. I classify these process controls here, and consider
their purposes, efficacy, and risks in Part III.
A.

Foreign Policy through Institutional Design

A great deal of political science and administrative law scholarship has
been devoted to considering agency design as a tool for political control of
the bureaucracy.61 Much of this literature is devoted to specific ex ante
creation decisions, such as agency independence from the President as
measured by a single vector, control over appointment and removal of the
agency’s leadership.62 This focus has less salience in the foreign policy and
national security arenas, where presidential power over the bureaucracy is
arguably at its peak. Informal norms of independence for some specific areas

60 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. OF L. AND ECON. 239 (1992).
61 Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 93, 100 (1992) (“the politicians who create administrative agencies can limit future
agency costs not only by establishing procedural and substantive rules under which such agencies
must operate, but also through the initial organizational design of the agency itself”); Moe, supra note
49; EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 47; LEWIS, supra note 57; Berry & Gerson, supra note 50.
62 See, e.g., Berry & Gerson, supra note 50, at 1012 (“The President's ability to influence the
bureaucracy … depends on a range of institutional features, including whether the agency's
leadership is insulated from presidential removal, the location of the agency inside or outside the
cabinet hierarchy, and the extent of presidential appointments in the agency, subject (or not) to
Senate approval.”); Lewis, supra note 57, at 28 (“Congress, at times, tries to circumscribe the
president’s influence with commissions instead of administrations, fixed terms for appointees,
qualifications for appointees, and location outside the cabinet.”).
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such as intelligence and law enforcement do exist, as well as occasional,
narrowly-tailored attempts at congressionally-mandated independence in
this sphere, though the constitutionality of removing these powers from
presidential control remains a matter of hot debate. 63 But agency
independence is not the primary vector along which Congress exerts
influence in the foreign policy and national security arena. It is thus worth
considering the foreign policy implications of other aspects of agency
design.
Congress is involved in the institutional design of the foreign policy and
national security infrastructure from top to bottom. Most of the agencies
and offices are, of course, created by legislation,64 and Congress has thus
been the critical player in creating most of the structures that engage our
foreign policy since the founding.65 That Congress chose to lodge so much
power in the Presidency through the establishment of, for example, a
Secretary of State and executive agency engaged in foreign affairs—the
Department of State—wholly subordinate to the President right from the
beginning might suggest congressional acquiescence in the executive’s
foreign affairs predominance. 66 But Congress’s role in the institutional
design of foreign policy does not begin and end with that initial creation of
a federal agency. Rather, Congress continues to remain involved through
both the regular creation—or termination—of offices within these
agencies, through the designation of personnel, including their employment
status and relationship to the President, and through the earmarking of
appropriations to agencies and offices.67

63 See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018); Rebecca
Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that
“prosecutorial independence” is in fact “built into the structure of American government.”);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of an independent counsel).
Morrison is considered by many to be “anti-canon.” See Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad
Law, LAWFARE (June 9, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v-olson-bad-law.
But see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
64 Some, like the NSA, are executive branch creations. See George Howe, An Early History of the
NSA,
at
https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassifieddocuments/cryptologic-spectrum/early_history_nsa.pdf. Some, like DHS, begin as executive branch
creations, in this case within the White House, and may later ratified and created as a full agency
through subsequent legislation. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. 1.
65 The State Department was the first executive branch agency, created as the Department of
Foreign Affairs, in 1789. John Jay had been appointed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
under the Articles of Confederation, 1784-89, and Thomas Jefferson became the first Secretary of
State in 1790, under the new legislation. Administrative Timeline of the Department of State, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/timeline/1789-1899 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
66 Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE
L.J. 231, 300 (2001) (arguing that in creating this new Department that was entirely beholden to the
President, “Congress had cut itself out of the picture.”).
67 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(f) (2018) (requiring the establishment of “a Coordinator of United
States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally … to operate internationally to carry
out prevention, care, treatment, support, capacity development, and other activities for combatting
HIV/AIDS”).
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At times of great upheaval or controversy, Congress has engaged this
particular tool aggressively to restructure the foreign policy or national
security institutions of the U.S. government. After World War II, Congress
reorganized the bureaucracy of warfighting and intelligence through the
National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent statutes, creating the
National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and other offices responsible for intelligence sprinkled throughout the
executive branch national security establishment, as well as consolidating
the armed services and civilian components of war under one department,
the Department of Defense (DOD).68 And Congress has re-engaged in
ways both small and big, including in response to the Church and Pike
Committees, and again after 9/11, to restructure the intelligence
community to rein in perceived excesses or resolve perceived deficiencies.69
Often, Congress acts in conjunction with the President to engage in
shared foreign policy goals. Even within that context, negotiations over
precisely how to structure an agency or which programs to fund provide
members of Congress—and especially members of the relevant
committees—with a means to influence executive policy-making, including
by narrowing executive requests even while agreeing to delegate power.70
But at times, Congress engages its design tools in ways that directly
oppose the sitting President’s prerogatives, sometimes favoring specific
bureaucrats within the rest of the executive branch. This takes many forms,
including refusals to fund a Presidential priority, which would have a direct
effect on the President’s policy-making by entirely or partially impeding it.
It also includes the opposite: refusals to cut funding to agencies or offices
that Congress deems important, thus privileging the bureaucrats within
those agencies in disregard of the President’s preferred approach. One
prominent recent example from the past few years has been Congress’s
repeated pushback against the Trump administration’s aggressive proposal

68 National Security Act of 1947. Amy Zegart has critiqued Congress’s design of these agencies,
arguing that poor design has led to major substantive policy failures. See Zegart, supra note 41.
69 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities,
1975-76
(Church
Committee),
available
at
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions
(recommending
structural changes to the intelligence community in the wake of abuses during the Watergate era).
The House undertook its own investigation, through the Pike Committee, though its final report was
released only through subsequent leaks. See Gerald Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the
CIA,
CIA.GOV,
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html#rft0; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to
oversee the executive branch Intelligence Community).
70 See, e.g., David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political
Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 73 (2002)
(discussing congressional pushback against executive branch requests for an even broader grant of
authority than what Congress ultimately enacted in the 2001 AUMF).
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to cut the State Department budget, initially by 28%.71 During budget
hearings in front of the House and Senate Committees in 2017, members
of Congress excoriated then-Secretary Rex Tillerson’s proposed cuts as
exhibiting poor foreign policy judgment and potentially endangering
national security.72 More important than the rhetoric, Congress ultimately
passed a spending bill that refused the proposed budget cuts, instead
making only modest cuts from 2017 levels.73
General appropriations and the creation of executive offices can be
both blunt and sharp instruments. In the broadest sense, Congress is
creating the fora in which foreign policy decisionmaking occurs, and by
insisting on funding the State Department, for example, at levels similar to
recent history, Congress makes clear that it intends the executive branch to
continue to use the “soft” power of diplomacy alongside the “hard” power
of military force. But such appropriations themselves can also include
more directed tools—for example, the 2018 fiscal bill included foreign
assistance for HIV programs that the Trump administration had wanted to
cut, specifically ensuring the continuation of an office devoted to policy
objectives contrary to the President’s.74
The existence of a building and offices with funding alone does not
direct policy outcomes, of course; but members of Congress are well aware
that individual agencies have distinct mandates and that personnel tend to
gravitate toward offices and agencies that match their priorities. Thus,
privileging funding for, say, the State Department will prioritize a different
set of policy goals—specifically diplomacy, soft power, foreign aid—than
would funding for the Department of Defense. Creating the fora for
particular types of decisionmaking and ensuring that they remain populated
with personnel devoted to a particular mandate creates path dependencies
and presumptions that favor continuity of particular policy objectives, and

71 Ronan Farrow, Inside Rex Tillerson’s Ouster, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2018)
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/inside-rex-tillersons-ouster; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION
22-23
(2018),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271013.pdf.
72 Carol Morello and Anne Gearan, Senators Sharply Question State Department Budget Cuts, WASH.
POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-arguesstate-departments-main-focus-should-be-on-us-security/2017/06/13/0438ebdc-503f-11e7-be253a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.df96264f3e8c; Press Release, House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Royce Remarks at Foreign Affairs Budget Hearing for Secretary Tillerson (June 14,
2017);
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/royce-remarks-at-foreign-affairs-budgethearing-with-secretary-tillerson/.
73 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141 Div. K. 132 Stat. 348, 833-971
(2018). Notably, the bill included aid for programs that the Trump Administration had proposed
severely cutting. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Spending Plan Passed by Congress is a Rebuke to Trump. Here’s
Why, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/trumpgovernment-spending-bill.html.
74 ONE, RED RIBBON OR WHITE FLAG? THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. GLOBAL AIDS RESPONSE 7-8
(2017) https://s3.amazonaws.com/one.org/pdfs/ONE_WAD_Report_2017.pdf; Consolidated
Appropriations Act Div. K, tit. III, 132 Stat. at 844-846.
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hurdles to significant change. And at the other extreme, the defunding or
closure of particular offices can have a significant impact on the executive
branch’s ability to engage a particular area or policy objective. When
Congress allocates funding to or away from particular agencies and offices,
it privileges certain personnel and certain kinds of decisionmaking over
others, and that this will shape policy outcomes.
B.

Foreign Policy through Administrative Procedure

Scholars of administrative law and political science have considered
Congress’s ability to control the executive branch through the imposition of
administrative procedures, in particular the Administrative Procedures Act,
which mandates procedures by which executive branch agencies must make
decisions.75 The Administrative Procedures Act itself largely exempts from
its application the executive branch’s foreign policy and national security
decisionmaking. 76 But Congress imposes a variety of procedural
requirements outside of the APA on the foreign policy and national security
decisionmaking of the executive branch—such as requirements that the
executive branch certify that specific criteria are met before it can act to,
say, provide aid to a foreign nation;77 or that it making a finding in writing
before it may take covert action; 78 or that the President make regular
reports on his activities to Congress.79
Scholars of political science and economics McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast suggest that Congress turns to administrative procedures as a
means of ensuring congressional control over the bureaucracy because of
the sheer impossibility of controlling every decision that the bureaucracy
makes. 80 In other words, administrative procedures are a second-best
alternative for members of Congress who would otherwise seek to control
the substance of decisionmaking directly. As I explore in this article,
however, there are multiple reasons—beyond the sheer scale of decisions
that must be made—that Congress might turn to process over substance as
a means of influencing policy, and this may be exacerbated in the foreign
policy context where Congress is even less inclined to legislate substance
than it is in the domestic sphere.

See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46.
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2018) (exempting “military or foreign
affairs function of the United States”). And the Supreme Court has held that the President is not
covered by the APA. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 US 788 (1992).
77 See Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 246 (1982); Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 217 (1999).
78 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)(1) (2018).
79 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1543 (2018).
80 McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46.
75
76
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Scholars have considered the extent to which specific procedures have a
real effect on government outcomes. Many have argued that certification
requirements, for example, are not effective in constraining presidential
decisionmaking.81 As I discuss in Part III, however, the efficacy of any
given process control depends on a variety of factors including context and
the relevant actors, and must be weighed against the likelihood of the
alternatives, respectively, inaction or substantive congressional legislation.
A significant body of work applying principles of administrative law to
foreign policy and national security focuses not on the efficacy of specific
administrative procedure requirements, but on the extent to which the
executive branch should be afforded deference on matters of war and
national security. 82 A thorough discussion of the role of courts in
influencing policy through their allocation of power inside the executive
branch is outside the scope of this article, but it is the subject of a
forthcoming project. Suffice it to say here that statutory process
requirements are interwoven with judicial review—they are a means by
which Congress can more effectively commandeer the courts to help it
influence executive branch policymaking, and to do so without necessarily
seeking direct responsibility over the policy itself.
C.

Foreign Policy through Designated Deciders

The primary focus of this Part is a third category of process control that
has received little attention in scholarship: the designation or modification
of executive branch decisionmaker as a means of influencing policy.
The choice of decider is a process control connected to, and at times
deployed through the use of, agency design and administrative procedures.
It is a highly-tailored tool, and can have a significant, targeted effect on the
policy positions of the U.S. government. Members of Congress may seek
to deploy this measure for multiple purposes: to advance a particular policy
objective, to depoliticize particular decisions or prioritize expertise, or to
constrain the President. They may seek to institutionalize a particular
decisionmaking process long term, perhaps for purposes of more efficient
governance,83 or they may seek to advance specific short-terms goals, by for
example designating a particular decisionmaker inside the executive branch
who they believe holds views more in line with their policy preferences than

Chinen, supra note 77.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV,. L. REV. 2663 (2005);
Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 783 (2011); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015); Harlan Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015).
83 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the use of process controls as a means of effectuating military
base closures).
81
82
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the alternative deciders.84 These purposes may and do overlap; moreover
different members of Congress may be compelled by different motivations
in supporting the same control measure.
The choice of decisionmaker may take different functional forms, each
of which may be usefully deployed for different specific purposes, and hold
different advantages and risks—to transparency, accountability, and
effectiveness in meeting a particular purpose. Some process controls shift
decisionmaking authority up, to a high-level official, which may increase
transparency but may also politicize. Other process controls shift deciders
horizontally, which could result in a major policy change if the change
occurs between decisionmakers who hold opposing views. And still others
diffuse decisionmaking among different deciders, or allocate it downward
to technocrats and career officials. This Section dissects and classifies this
form of process control according to function. I then consider in Part III
the advantages, efficacy, and risks involved in deploying these different
forms of process controls.
1. Vertical Shift in Decider
One process control that Congress deploys is to shift decisionmaking
authority up or down the hierarchy within the executive branch. This
designation may take the form of a delegation of authority to a particular
agency head, but other procedural tools—such as a certification
requirement, waiver authority, or reporting obligation—may each be
deployed as a means of channeling decision-making authority in a particular
office, or of shifting decision-making authority further down the chain of
command. This category of process control may be deployed for the
purpose of promoting a particular policy objective by advantaging a favored
agency or official, of constraining presidential prerogative, or of ensuring
that a particular agency’s expertise is deployed in a decisionmaking process.
It could also be motivated by an interest in increasing accountability for a
particular type of decision.85 Shifting decisionmaking authority up, to, say,
the head of an agency or even to the President, might be done for the
purpose of increasing accountability or transparency for a matter, or raising
the profile of a matter in the public eye. Shifting authority down, by
contrast, might be done for the purpose of taking a matter out of the hands
of the President, and, if shifted to career bureaucrats, of setting a decision
at a remove from partisan politics, or of ensuring expertise is prioritized in
the process.

84 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (detailing the Trump administration’s use of
Section 232 as a justification for imposing tariffs).
85 See infra Part III.A (discussing purposes for congressional use of process controls).
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Congressional responses to then-President Barack Obama’s pledge to
shutter the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay provide an
example of both types of vertical shifts—a shift away from Presidential
control as well as away from anonymous bureaucratic decisionmaking, and
toward a particular executive branch official, here the Secretary of Defense.
A brief history is necessary for background: Obama’s predecessor,
President George Bush, who first turned to the naval base at Guantanamo
as a location for military detention facilities in the conflict with al Qaeda,
himself ultimately asserted a policy of closing the detention facilities. 86
Nevertheless, Obama became inextricably linked with the argument for
closure, as he made it a campaign pledge while running for President, and
as one of his very first actions in office issued an Executive Order
commanding its closure within a year.87 To do so, he established working
groups that would review the case for detention and recommend
disposition (transfer, release, continued detention) for each detainee at
Guantanamo.88
Opposition to this plan soon grew in Congress, with many members
calling for the facility to remain open. Instead of passing a statute
mandating that the detention facilities remain open, however, Congress
passed stringent process controls, year after year, which constricted the
Administration’s efforts to transfer detainees off the base and ultimately
posed a significant hurdle to closing the facility. Beginning in 2010,
members of Congress attached to the defense appropriations bill onerous
restrictions on the President’s ability to transfer detainees from the facilities
abroad. 89 Rather than simply mandate that Guantanamo remain open,
either by prohibiting the use of funds to close it (as Congress ultimately
did 90 ), or by denying funds for transfers full stop (as Congress also
ultimately did for several countries91), Congress enacted requirements that
the Secretary of Defense make rigid certifications about the security threat

86 See Jack Goldsmith, The Bush Administration Wanted to Close GTMO Because (in Part) of its
Propaganda Value to Jihadists, LAWFARE (February 5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bushadministration-wanted-close-gtmo-because-part-its-propaganda-value-jihadists (citing President
George Bush as stating that the detention facility had become a recruiting tool for al Qaeda, and thus
that he had “worked to find a way to close the prison without compromising security.”)
87 Executive Order 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (2009)
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No.
111-383, 5 1033(b)(5), 124 Stat. 4137, 4352 (2011); National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal
Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1028, 125 Stat. 1298 (2012).
90 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1035, 130
Stat. 2488 (2017).
91 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1033, 129
Stat. 726, 968-69 (2016).
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of any transfer 30 days before it could occur.92 Among the requirements,
these provisions mandated that before a detainee could be transferred to a
foreign country, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, must certify that the government in question “has agreed
to take effective steps to ensure that the individual cannot take action to
threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future; [and] has
taken such steps as the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure that the
individual cannot engage or reengage in any terrorist activity.”93 The result
of this designation was that Congress took functional decisionmaking
authority out of the hands of a panel of career executive branch officials
from national security offices throughout the executive branch, as dictated
by Executive Order, and funneled it more squarely and transparently into
the (reluctant) hands of the Secretary of Defense.94
There may have been multiple purposes animating Congress’s
deployment of this process control: certainly some members held strong
policy preferences in favor of keeping the detention facilities at
Guantanamo open, and placing constraints on transfers was a means to that
end.95 These preferences may have been motivated by, or simply coincided
with, the views of some within the national security bureaucracy inside the
government, who reportedly opposed closure of the facilities and made
those views known—including through regular reports on detainee
recidivism—to members of Congress.96 Other members may have held less
strongly-formed views on keeping Guantanamo open, and might not have
supported a substantive bill to that effect, but were either willing to

92 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 5
1033(b)(5), 124 Stat. 4137, 4352 (2011); National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1028, 125 Stat. 1298 (2012).
93 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §
1033(b)(4), 124 Stat. 4137, 4352 (2011) (emphasis added).
94 Exec. Order 13567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011) (designating a “Periodic Review Board” of senior
officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, the Offices of the
Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review the
continued detention of Guantanamo detainees.) The Secretary of Defense was charged with
coordinating the review, and along with the Secretary of State responsible for the safe transfer of
detainees who did not meet the standard for continued detention. Id.
95 Katie
Glueck, Graham: Gitmo's 'crazy bastards,' POLITICO (Nov. 30, 2012)
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/sen-lindsey-graham-calls-guantanamo-bay-detaineescrazy-bastards-084449; Mitch McConnell, There Are No Good Alternatives to Guantanamo, WASH. POST
(Mar.
15,2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031302907.html.
96 See Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 544-54 (2017) (positing
that bureaucratic resistance to Obama may have been a driving force behind legislative efforts to halt
transfers); Ingber, The Obama War Powers, supra note 53; Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed to Close
Guantánamo, NEW YORKER (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/whyobama-has-failed-to-close-guantanamo (discussing opposition to closing Guantanamo within the
Department of Defense).
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support—or felt they could not oppose—provisions requiring that the
Defense Secretary certify transfers out of the prison were not a threat.97
Whatever the motivations of various members of Congress in
deploying this process control, it appears to have had a significant effect on
the substantive policy of Guantanamo closure. By designating the Secretary
of Defense as the decider in this context, and not just the decider but the
public face of the determination, Congress harnessed the reticence of the
Secretary of Defense to make such certifications, and placed its thumb on
the scale on the side of those within the Department of Defense and
elsewhere in the executive branch who were reticent to close the facility in
internal conflict over Guantanamo transfers. 98 With the certification
requirements in place, the flow of detainees from Guantanamo slowed to a
near halt.99
2. Horizontal Shift in Decider
Congress may at times seek to shift decisionmaking authority from one
official inside the administration to another at the same rank, such as from
one head of an agency to another. This process control may be motivated
by a policy agenda, if for example, there is a belief that one individual’s
policy views may be preferable to another’s. Or the implementation of
such a control may simply reflect a view that a particular office is better
suited for such decisions, or that the public may perceive that to be the
case.
An example of a horizontal shift is the changing placement of
decisionmaking authority over tariffs, and specifically the national security
justification for imposing tariffs, that I discuss in the introduction. Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, currently authorizes
the President to impose restrictions on imports if the Commerce Secretary,
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, finds them necessary to
mitigate a threat to national security.100 Recent communications between
the Commerce and Defense Secretaries in accordance with this legislative
requirement unearthed concerns by the then-Secretary of Defense James
Mattis that tariffs proposed by the President and supported by the

See, e.g., infra note 156 and accompanying text.
Bruck, supra note 96 (quoting a senior defense official as stating that the certification
requirements changed the internal debate. Whereas previously, due to the Administration’s “focus
on closing Guantánamo—you risked your job if you weren’t on board,” the statutory requirements
gave officials “the ability to be openly in favor of transferring people but unable to do it, because of
the law.”)
99 JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
WARTIME DETENTION PROVISIONS IN RECENT DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION 30 (2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42143.pdf (acknowledging the slowdown but asserting agnosticism
as to the reason).
100 19 U.S.C. §1862 (2018).
97
98
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Commerce Secretary would exacerbate, rather than resolve, national
security concerns.101 Perhaps hoping to leverage the Pentagon’s reticence in
this area, several bipartisan groups in Congress have proposed bills that
would amend Section 232 to place more direct authority squarely in the
hands of the Defense Secretary to constrain the President from imposing
tariffs under this provision.102
Congress does not turn to process controls to influence trade policy
and constrain the President out of a want of formal authority to direct
United States trade policy itself. The Constitution gives to Congress, not
the President, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 103
That the President today holds significant power to impose tariffs is the
result of a series of expanding congressional delegations, delegations that
Congress could, but thus far does not, roll back.104
And yet, Congress has repeatedly deployed process controls as a means
of influencing trade policy instead of dialing back delegations of authority,
even at times deploying these controls alongside expansions of such
delegations.105 In fact, the horizontal shift contemplated by these recent
bills is a frequently deployed move for Congress as a means of influencing
U.S. trade policy. Congress has already shifted the decisionmaker for this
particular tariff justification about four times, give or take, since it began
delegating control over tariffs to the executive branch in the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930—from a series of offices within the White House, to the

101 See Memorandum from Def. Sec’y James Mattis to Commerce Sec’y Wilbur Ross (on file
with
author),
originally
available
at
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_t
o_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf (expressing skepticism that the tariffs at issue
were necessary to national security, and concerns that they could instead strain relationships with
allies).
102 See supra notes 9-10. See also Press Release, Sen. Doug Jones, Sens. Jones, Portman, Ernst
Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Reform National Security Tariff Process & Increase
Congressional Oversight (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.jones.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/senators-jones-portman-ernst-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-reform-national-securitytariff-process-and-increase-congressional-oversight (stating that placing the decision authority over
the national security justification directly in the hands of the Defense Secretary would “ensure that
the statute is used for genuine national security purposes”)(emphasis added).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
104 See infra notes 105-106.
105 As an example, in 1934 Congress expanded the President’s power to enter into trade
agreements and adjust tariffs in conjunction with those agreements. An Act to Amend the Tariff Act
of 1930, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). The stated intention of the Act at the time was to
empower the President to reduce tariffs quickly in the midst the Great Depression, in accordance
with powers held by executive’s in other states. House Rep. No. 1000, at 5 (1934). Twenty years
later, while continuing to extend this authorization, Congress enacted the first version of the national
security justifications with the intention of providing industries an opportunity to petition for tariff
protection. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166
(1955); 101 Cong. Rec. 5298 (1955) (noting benefits associated with having single director in charge
who would be responsive to industry).
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Treasury Department, to Commerce, and now it may well move the
authority again to the Department of Defense.106
The history of Congress’s horizontal shifts in decisionmaker aligns
with—and can be partially explained by—an evolution in Congress’s policy
preferences on trade vis-à-vis the President throughout this period.
Interestingly, the relative positions of the President and Congress have
shifted dramatically in the Trump administration from previous political
contexts when Congress deployed these controls. At the time of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, it was Congress looking to restrict
imports as a means of protecting domestic industry, and the President
seeking flexibility to reduce tariffs.107 Smoot-Hawley established a series of
tariffs, and empowered a body called the Tariff Commission, appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,108 to report to the
President on the need to adjust them, giving the President the authority to
approve those recommended changes as necessary.109 Subsequent statutes
expanded the President’s authority to adjust tariffs, and the 1955 Extension
of Trade Agreement Authority first codified the national security
justification, requiring the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization
(an office within the White House) 110 to investigate national security
concerns with imports, and report to the President, who was then
permitted to adjust imports in accordance with the report after the
President conducted his own independent investigation.111 After additional
extensions,112 Congress codified the national security exception in the 1962

106 See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1501, 102
Stat. 1107, 1257-1260 (1988) (maintaining Commerce Department control over 232 authority but
requiring consultation with the Department of Defense); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §
127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94 (shifting power from the Office of Emergency Planning to the
Department of Treasury); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872,
877 (shifting power from the Office of Military and Civilian Mobilization to the Office of
Emergency Planning); Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 8(b), 72 Stat.
673, 678-79 (1958) (moving power to the Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization); Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (1955) (lodging the
power in the Office of Defense Mobilization). At times, these changes simply reflected changes in
name or combining of offices by the executive. See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 1, 23 Fed. Reg 4991
(1958) (combining offices to create the Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization). But Congress
played a role in each shift—reorganization plans gave Congress the opportunity to reject the transfer
of office, but Congress instead ratified it. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 429, at 24 (1979) (approving of the
transfer of authority from the Treasury Department to Commerce Department).
107 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 330(a), 46 Stat. 590, 696-697.
108 The Commission itself was created in a separate earlier act. Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 64271, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795 (1916). At the time, however, the Commission filled an investigatory
and advisory role, with little power to alter existing tariff rates. Id. § 706, 39 Stat. at 796.
109 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 330(a), 46 Stat. 590, 696-697.
110 The Office of Defense Mobilization was created during the Truman administration. Exec.
Order No. 10193 (1950) (creating office and designating the appointment procedure of advice and
consent by the Senate).
111 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (1955).
112 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 8(b), 72 Stat. 673, 678-79
(1958) (extending temporary authorization).
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Trade Act, and changed the title of the responsible office to the Director of
the Office of Emergency Planning to align with the name change within the
White House.113
The legislative history provides some context for the decision to deploy
these controls to place some decisionmaking authority over the national
security justification in the hands of this White House office. In particular,
there was a sense among members of Congress and industry lobbyists that
obligating this office to issue a report would be more, not less, likely to result
in a decision to impose tariffs than placing the power with the President
directly, either because the President might himself be opposed, or because
taking the explicit authority away from this office would empower other
stakeholders inside the executive branch—namely the State Department—
who might have reasons, such as diplomatic concerns, to oppose tariffs.114
In fact, representatives from affected industries hoping to convince the
President to levy tariffs testified before Congress to this effect, arguing in
favor of keeping the reporting requirement with the Office of Emergency
Planning.115 A representative of the textile industries testified that the State
Department was in fact “resisting a finding by the Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization, now called the Office of Emergency Planning, that
imports of textiles are threatening to impair the national security.”116 Were
Congress to remove that office from the language of the statute, the
representative worried, the President might not choose to request their
advice, out of concern that “a favorable finding in the national security case
by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization … would cause some
inconvenience so far as diplomatic relations with foreign countries.” 117

113 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877. The name
change was effectuated in response to a request from President Kennedy, who had transferred much
of the authority of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Department of Defense. See
Office of Emergency Planning Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 87-296, 75 Stat. 630 (1961) (codifying
change of name to the Office of Emergency Planning). This name was again altered in 1968 to the
Office of Emergency Preparedness. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 90-608, § 402,
82 Stat. 1190, 1194 (1968).
114 See, e.g., Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 9900 Part 5, 87 Cong. 3063
(1962) (Statement of Eugene Stewart, Counsel, Man-Made Fiber Products); Id. at 2715-16 (Statement
of Harry B. Purcell, Vice President, the Torrington Co.) (“To leave to the sole determination the
person who occupies the White House which tariff cuts would or would not ‘threaten to impair the
national security’ would be sheer folly.”).
115 Id.; see also Id. at 1460 (statement of Donald J. Hawthorne) (arguing in favor on behalf of the
watch industry); Id. at 1579 (statement of Ralph Frey) (arguing in favor on behalf of the precision ball
bearing industry); Id. at 1723 (statement of John H. Lichtblau) (arguing to keep the procedure and
limit the time permitted for reports). But see Id. at 1820 (statement of Otis H. Ellis, General Counsel,
National Oil Jobbers Council, Inc.) (arguing against the national security justification); Hearings Before
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 9900 Part 3, 87 Cong. 1380-81 (1962) (statement of Charles
W. Engelhard) (arguing that the defense provision is a “cloak for the narrowest protectionist
pressures”).
116 Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th
Cong. 3063 (1962) (statement of Eugene Stewart, Counsel, Man-Made Fiber Producers).
117 Id.
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Instead, such a statute “would facilitate the ease with which the State
Department can subvert and oppose and prevent favorable findings in
these national security cases.”118 In other words, industry professionals
believed that despite the Office of Emergency Planning’s placement inside
the White House, a reporting requirement placed on that office would be
more likely to compel the President to levy tariffs than were the same
substantive delegation made to him directly, because he might in that case
prioritize the views of different actors inside the executive branch, namely
the State Department.119
Over subsequent amendments, Congress continued to shift the decider
over the national security justification, changing the designation first to the
Secretary of the Treasury,120 when the Office of Emergency Planning was
abolished, 121 and then to Commerce. 122 At one point, industry
representatives, particularly the precision ball bearing industry, lobbied
Congress to shift the authority to the Defense Department, based on
suggestions that Defense officials would have been more favorable to
industry interests in promoting tariffs. 123 One member of Congress
vociferously argued in favor of shifting the authority to DOD, and
suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other executive branch
officials believed shared this belief.124 Ultimately, Congress landed on a
compromise solution, and amended Section 232 to require that the
Treasure Secretary, and then the Secretary of Commerce, consult with and
receive an assessment from the Secretary of Defense.125
Many of these shifts appear to have been prompted at least in part by
an interest in meeting the concerns of industry officials who hoped to
prompt the President to levy, rather than constrain, tariffs on particular

Id.
Id.
120 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94.
121 Reorganization Plan No. 1, § 3, 38 Fed. Reg. 9579 (1973) (disbanding the office and
transferring powers held by the office to the Treasury Department).
122 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1501, 102 Stat.
1107, 1257-1260 (1988); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94.
123 Tariff and Trade Proposals: Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 91st Cong.,3345 (1970).
124 Id. at 3345-49.
125 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94. The requirement of
consultation with the Department of Defense continued into the next iteration of the national
security justification. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
1501, 102 Stat. 1107, 1257-1260 (1988). The decision to lodge the power exclusively in the Secretary
of Treasury and then the Commerce, rather than the Department of Defense, appears to be due to
concerns about access to necessary economic data. Hearings Before the Comm. on Finance United States
Senate, Threat to Certain Imports to National Security, 99th Cong. 24-26 (1986) (Statement of Senator
Byrd) (“The Commerce Department has much of the economic data on American industries and the
scope of foreign imports; but this is not a conventional trade question. The language of the statute
makes it clear that the threat of injury to national security must be assessed after weighing many
factors, many of them within the expertise of the Department of Defense.”).
118
119
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industries, in a context where he was deemed unlikely to do so were he
granted the authority unilaterally. Today we find the policy preferences
reversed: the President is inclined to use his delegated authorities to impose
tariffs, and Congress appears to be seeking ways to constrain him.126 In
both of these contexts, however, members of Congress have turned to
process controls rather than changes to substantive delegations of power in
order to effectuate their preferences.
3. Excise Decisionmaking Responsibility and Power
At times Congress may seek to create new entities as a means of placing
decision-making at a remove from existing options. Congress’s handling of
the impasse over military base closures in the late 1980s by creating a new
commission to make the necessary decisions is a prime example of
congressional excision of decisionmaking.
In the wake of the Vietnam war, after the Department of Defense
under President Kennedy closed over 60 military bases, decisions to close
military bases became politically fraught. The Department of Defense was
determined to cut costs by eliminating “underutilized” bases, and yet
closing any given military base entailed a sure loss of jobs, raising the
profile of base closures on the domestic policy agenda for Congress.127
Congress passed legislation increasingly involving itself in base closure
decisions, ultimately in 1977 mandating that they approve all large base
closures. 128 Yet voting for base closure was a political hot potato; no
politician could support closing a military base in his or her own district.129
As a result, it became nearly impossible for the Department of Defense to
close military bases, at significant cost.130
Ultimately, in response in part to changing politics, budgetary concerns,
and lobbying efforts by the Department of Defense, the concept of closing
military bases gained support in Congress, at least in theory.131 But the
question remained how to make that happen considering the domestic

126 Nevertheless, concerns regarding the potential abuse of Section 232 were voiced by
Congressmembers at the time of the passage of these various amendments, but they were largely
overridden by a belief in the prudential nature of the executive office. See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 93-571, at
199 (1973) (minority views) (“There is no question that this bill would make the President of the
United States the foreign trade czar of this nation.”).
127 DEF. SEC’Y’S COMM’N ON BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE, BASE REALIGNMENTS AND
CLOSURES; REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SECRETARY’S COMMISSION (Dec. 1988), available at
https://www.acq.osd.mil/brac/Downloads/Prior%20BRAC%20Rounds/1988.pdf,
[hereinafter
1988 BRAC Report]; EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 47, at 1-4.
128 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2018) (requiring congressional approval for “the closure of any military
installation at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed”).
129 1988 BRAC Report, supra note 127; EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 47, at 1-4.
130 1988 BRAC Report, supra note 127, at 8-9 (noting that “Since passage of this legislation over
a decade ago, there has not been a single major base closure.”).
131 EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 47, at 2.
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political costs. Delegating the decision directly to DOD did not resolve the
political question, as the Secretary of Defense was himself a political
appointee. 132 The solution—proposed by DOD and adopted by
Congress—was to delegate decisions about base closures to a bipartisan
commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and reporting both to
him and to Congress.133 The Secretary of Defense and Congress retained a
veto over the ultimate proposal—each could take action to reject the
Commission’s list in its entirety—but the process allowed them to shift the
political costs of choosing a base onto the independent commission, an
entity less inclined to feel such costs.134
4. Diffuse Decisionmaking Responsibility and Power
At other times members of Congress may seek to diffuse
decisionmaking responsibility and power, rather than channel it to a
decisionmaking body. This may be done through a variety of measures,
including concurrent delegations to multiple agencies, requirements of
coordination, or mandatory consultation provisions.135 Such requirements
are fairly common, particularly in the domestic regulatory space, and may
be motivated by various purposes. Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi identify
several different rationales for overlapping control in their article, Agency
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, including: turf wars among members
of congressional committees; an interest in removing decisionmaking from
the President; desire to include multiple spheres of expertise in
decisionmaking; compromise; and accident.136 To this list I would add an
interest in constraining or slowing down presidential action, which is
evident in the recent Syria and Republic of Korea bills I discuss in the end
of this section.137
Since 2017, Congress has used the National Defense Authorization Act
to limit the President’s ability to conduct bilateral military operations with
Russia, through fact-finding conditions placed jointly on the Secretaries of
Defense and State. Specifically, the statute conditions funding for such
bilateral operations on a certification by the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State that “(1) the Russian Federation
has ceased its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive activities

Id., at 3.
Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, S.
2749, 100th Cong., 102 Stat. 2623 § 202 (1988).
134 Id.
135 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1131, 1145 (2012).
136 Id. at 1138-43.
137 Bijal Shah considers and classifies congressional mechanisms to force interagency
coordination for a range of purposes including constraint of the President in an excellent
forthcoming article, Congress’s Agency Coordination. See 103 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
132
133
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that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (2) the Russian
Federation is abiding by the terms of and taking steps in support of the
Minsk Protocols regarding a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine.”138
Similarly, Congress recently added to the defense appropriations act a
delegation to the United States Cyber Command of the power to undertake
proportionate defensive cyber operations against Russia, contingent on the
“the National Command Authority determin[ing] that the Russian
Federation is conducting an active, systematic, and ongoing campaign of
attacks against the government or people of the United States in
cyberspace.”139 The National Command Authority is comprised of the
President and the Secretary of Defense, and thus a delegation contingent on
its determination appears to dilute the delegation of power, at least as
compared to a delegation to the President alone.140 The ostensible purpose
here is to facilitate the Defense Department’s ability to undertake these
kinds of defensive cyber operations, and the inclusion of the Secretary of
Defense as a necessary component of the determination of Russian activity
would seem designed to assist in that endeavor. This may well operate to
facilitate action in practice, depending on the process the Secretary of
Defense and the President have for making National Command Authority
decisions. But as a general matter, a mechanism of joint control such as
this one likely would be more effective as a means of constraining the
President—as it positions the Secretary of Defense as a statutory hurdle to
action.
Recently, a spate of proposed bills have sought to engage this process
tool as a means of effectuating a particular policy. In 2018 and 2019,
several senators introduced bills to engage several national security agencies
in the decisionmaking process over new sanctions on Russian over election
interference. Senators Marco Rubio and Chris Van Hollen twice proposed
a bill—titled the DETER Act—that would place the critical trigger over
foreign state sanctions in the hands of the director of national intelligence
and other intelligence officials—and quite pointedly not the President.141

138 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1232(a),
130 Stat. 2488 (2017) (amended 2018, 2019). The NDAA 2019 includes a carve-out for “bilateral
military-to-military dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation for the purpose
of reducing the risk of conflict.” Id. at § 1247.
139 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 5515, 115th
Cong. § 1623 (2018).
140 See also Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE
(July 26, 2018, 2:07 P.M.), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-newndaa (taking note of this designation to the “NCA as opposed to just the president” as “[v]ery
interesting.”).
141 Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2018, S. 2313, 115th
Cong. § 201 (2018); Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019, 116th
Cong. (2019) [hereinafter DETER Act].

Draft September 18, 2019

32

Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs

The proposed bill would trigger a requirement that the President—through
the Treasury Secretary—impose sanctions on Russia or any other state
should the Director of National Intelligence (“in consultation with the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the
National Security Agency, and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency”) make a finding that the state has interfered in American
elections.142 Unlike the cyber operations provisions of the NDAA, which
simply grant authority, conditioned on the finding of the National
Command Authority, the DETER act would require action, conditioned on
the Director of National Intelligence’s finding of fact.
And in January 2019, a bipartisan group in the House introduced two
bills aimed—in their own descriptions—at preventing the President from
withdrawing troops from the Republic of Korea and Syria through funding
limitations.143 Neither bill would require that the President keep troops in
either Syria or on the Korean Peninsula. 144 Instead, each would make
funding contingent on specific executive branch officials meeting certain
procedural obligations. The Syria bill would prohibit the use of funds to
withdraw troops from Syria unless Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, and the Director of National Intelligence submit a report to Congress
answering fifteen (15) onerous questions about the state of affairs in
Syria.145 The Republic of Korea bill is far more aggressive: it prohibits the
use of funds to withdraw troops from the Korean peninsula unless the
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify, inter
alia, that “the Republic of Korea would be fully capable of defending itself
and deterring a conflict on the Korean Peninsula that would threaten
United States interests following such a reduction; [and] that North Korea
has completed verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmaments.”146 Should
they pass, these would undoubtedly face some pushback from the President
as infringing on his commandeer-in-chief authority, which I discuss further
below. But historically, Presidents have often chosen to comply with
procedural requirements despite raising separation-of-powers concerns, and
despite the clear hurdle they may pose to their policy agenda.147

DETER Act, supra note 141.
Responsible Withdrawal From Syria Act, H.R.914, 116th Congress; United States and
Republic of Korea Alliance Support Act, H.R.889, 116th Congress.
144 Id.
145 Syria Act, supra.
146 Republic of Korea Act, supra.
147 See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s nearly perfect
compliance with the Guantanamo certification requirements, which he had critiqued in a signing
statement as potentially raising separation-of-powers concerns.)
142
143
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5. Implicit Allocations of Decisionmaking Power
In addition to direct, targeted designations of specific deciders,
Congress also allocates decisionmaking authority inside the executive
branch implicitly, to unnamed administrators whose work product is
required by the terms of the statute. When Congress premises a statutory
delegation of power to the President or head of an agency on the condition
that certain procedurals be followed, facts found, or reports provided to
Congress, this necessitates the involvement of certain types of actors within
the executive branch, namely: “experts,” “professionals,” “technocrats,”
lawyers. 148 The expert class of officials within the executive branch is
typically made up of non-politically-appointed civil servants, operating
around the middle tiers of the executive branch bureaucracy.149 Their role
is essential to adequately carrying out process requirements like fact-finding
or reporting to Congress. Thus, even without explicitly naming an office or
official in its delegation of power, Congress can influence the organization
of decisionmaking inside the executive branch by legislating process
requirements.
Statutory requirements that executive branch officials engage in
particular processes, or find specific facts, or explain their actions before
acting fall within the “administrative procedures” category I discuss above.
But they are also a vehicle through which Congress can designate deciders
by steering power away from the President and toward lower level officials,
even while delegating it to, or accepting its use by, the executive branch as a
whole.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Congressional influence on foreign affairs through the administration
of executive branch decisionmaking has numerous implications—for
Congress’s ability to influence foreign policy, for transparency and
accountability of foreign policy decisions, for the extent to which the
President is in fact bound by law—and it can be judged according to each
of these criteria

148 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46, at 244 (“procedures can be used to
enfranchise important constituents in agency decision-making processes, thereby assuring that
agencies are responsive to their interests”). Adrian Vermeule and Elizabeth Magill have written about
a similar effect on executive branch decisionmaking of judicial doctrines and process requirements,
although their focus was on these doctrines’ “upward” allocation of power within agencies.
Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1061
(2011).
149 Magill & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 1067; DANIEL P. CARPENTER, The FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001).
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When considering these implications and the value of process controls,
one must weigh them against the actual alternatives, taking into account the
potential for their realization. These alternatives include on the one hand
more direct involvement of Congress, such as through direct substantive
efforts to legislate policy, or, on the other hand, an even starker abdication
of influence to the President. Congressional administration can be weighed
against those alternatives on two levels: as a descriptive matter (why might
members of Congress prefer these forms of engagement to the alternatives)
and as a more normative one (whether these forms are advantageous as a
matter of policy, and whether they raise different or fewer constitutional
issues).
A.

Why Deploy Process Controls to Influence Foreign Policy

There are many reasons members of Congress might turn to process
controls to influence policy short of mandating its substance. Targeted
process controls may permit members of Congress to push past hurdles
that would otherwise impede action. They may provide a means of
resolving conflicts or promoting a policy that could not be addressed or
passed through substantive legislation. At times process controls may even
be more efficacious in influencing policy than would be substantive
legislation seeking to mandate it directly. I explore these reasons in further
detail in this section.
1. Why do Process Controls Surmount Congressional Reticence?
There are numerous reasons Congress does not take full advantage of
its foreign affairs power. Some may be based in genuine concern about the
relative institutional competence of Congress in this realm as against the
executive branch—whether these concerns are based in a belief that the
United States should speak with one voice, and that voice should be the
President’s, or out of a sense of deference to the executive branch’s relative
expertise, access to information, and dispatch. For reasons of expediency
and good government, including the interest in presenting a unified United
States foreign policy to the world, members of Congress might reasonably
take the view that the President and the executive branch are best placed to
control foreign policy decisionmaking.
Of course, history suggests that these concerns are not sufficient to
compel Congress to sit out entirely. There have been multiple occasions
when members of Congress—both through duly-enacted legislation and
through separate unilateral action—have sought to press their own foreign
policy objectives. Moreover, they have done so not only when the
President has hesitated to act itself, but even in the face of the President’s
clear, contrary foreign policy goals. Congress’s attempt to legislate U.S.
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recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is one such example.150 For
a non-legislative attempt to interfere with the President’s foreign policy
agenda, consider the “open letter to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of
Iran,” signed by 47 Republican Senators, opposing President Obama’s Iran
nuclear deal.151
I see no separation-of-powers rationale for distinguishing between these
and other foreign policy decisions in which Congress chooses not to
challenge the President’s agenda. Rather the distinction is likely to be a
political one. In these limited examples, members of Congress found a
political advantage to a foreign policy showdown with the President, and
little disadvantage. More often, however, there are significant political
reasons that Congress declines to take a strong stand in the foreign policy
arena. When one or both houses of Congress are held by the same political
party as the President, members may find it politically unsavory or
inopportune to challenge him generally, especially on foreign policy.152 And
even when opposing parties control both the House or Senate, members
may find it more politically useful to be able to criticize the President’s
choices than having to own a particular foreign policy themselves. They
may find that their constituents are not as interested in questions of foreign
policy as in domestic, and therefore there is little to be gained politically by
engaging directly in this space. 153 Congressional abdication on foreign
policy matters may also have a self-fulfilling, snowballing effect that
connects back up to institutional reasons for abdication: as members of
Congress sit out major debates on war and foreign policy, they lose (or fail
to gain) expertise in these realms. And as Congress has fallen back on
foreign policy, the executive branch has been more than willing to fill the
void.
Whatever the reason for congressional timidity in the foreign policy
realm, congressional administration through process controls provides an
alternate vehicle to facilitate congressional influence in this realm that may
avoid some of the stumbling blocks that otherwise hold Congress back.
First, unlike mandating substance directly, shaping foreign policy
through the use of process controls enables Congress to exploit, rather than
undermine, the advantages in the foreign policy realm that the executive
holds over Congress, such as expertise, or access to information. As with

See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084-85.
An Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/middleeast/document-the-letter-senaterepublicans-addressed-to-the-leaders-of-iran.html?_r=1&module=inline.
152 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2312, 2313-15 (2006).
153 See, e.g., HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER, supra note 34, at 193 (“most
citizens, most of the time, come to foreign policy discussions with fewer well-defined and
independently formulated prior beliefs than they do to domestic policy debates.”)
150
151

Draft September 18, 2019

36

Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs

other areas of policymaking, Congress may quite reasonably acknowledge
that it is not—at least as it has evolved—capable of tackling the enormity
and complexity of all decisions that the executive branch bureaucracy
undertakes. 154 Process controls thus permit Congress to influence the
shape of decisions while benefiting from the vastness and complexity of the
bureaucracy, and with it executive branch expertise, information,
expediency, and flexibility.
Second, congressional use of process controls may permit members of
Congress to influence policy without necessarily damaging the state’s ability
to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs. While that “one voice” may
presumptively be the President’s, in practice, it has always been the result of
executive branch deliberation more broadly. That Congress may influence
the internal dynamics that result in that position does not necessarily
undercut the President’s stature abroad as the expected mouthpiece for the
U.S. government.
Third, it may be easier for proponents of a measure to obtain votes on
a bill including a process control than on one compelling a particular
substantive policy. Process controls are often attached to broader
legislation packages on which members are voting, potentially creating an
opt-out versus an opt-in scenario for choosing whether to support the bill.
Moreover, process controls may appear more “neutral” than substantive
legislation. 155 Whereas a substantive provision may engender sufficient
support to compel members to vote against it, a process control will be less
likely to be a make-or-break component of the bill.156
Finally, process controls give members of Congress a means of pushing
back against a President even when it could be politically costly to do so
more directly. 157 Adding process requirements to a statutory grant of
power, or designating a particularly trusted executive branch official as the
decisionmaker on a specific grant of authority, is hardly as headlinegrabbing or as conflict-creating as would be openly legislating a policy

154 McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46, at 254 (“an important function of
administrative procedures is to provide a means of inducing bureaucratic compliance that does not
require the time, effort, and resources of political actors.”).
155 See Lindsay and Ripley, supra note 52, at 28 (“the ‘ostensibly neutral’ character of procedure
makes it easier to build a winning coalition around procedural changes than around substantive
policy changes.”)
156 See, e.g, David Manners-Webber, Comment, Certification as Sabotage: Lessons from Guantanamo
Bay, 127 YALE L. J. 1416, 1442-44 (2018) (discussing interviews with several members of Congress
that suggest they voted for process controls that would effectuate a policy that they would not have
supported); Dara Lind, Republicans have Obama in a Corner on Syrian Refugees, VOX (Nov. 19, 2015, 2:06
PM) https://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9762054/congress-obama-refugees-syria (calling a bill that
would slow the process of accepting refugees by requiring certifications by high-level administration
officials “anodyne enough that it's attracted broad support from congressional Democrats as well as
Republicans”).
157 See, e.g., DETER Act, supra note 141.
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contrary to the President’s. Moreover, process controls typically leave the
politically sensitive decisions in the hands of bureaucrats—whether lowerlevel technocrats or high-level heads of agencies, permitting members of
Congress to avoid or even deny responsibility for the resulting policy
should it fail or prove unpopular. Whether the process control delegates to
technocrats or to the head of an agency, it permits members of Congress to
shift the political costs of decisionmaking to the executive branch, while
still retaining some influence over the policy.
2. Process Controls and Purpose
Congressional deployment of process controls to influence foreign
policy may be motivated by diverse purposes. In fact, any given
mechanism of control may be driven by multiple, varied motivations
among the members of Congress who supported it.158 These motivations
may include mistrust of the President, conflicting views over the preferred
policy objective, or an interest in avoiding political costs for a necessary
action.
Process control measures deployed for the purpose of promoting a
preferred policy objective may involve a shift of decisionmaker to an
agency or office likely to press policy objectives in line with those of
members of Congress, such as the statutory mandate that the Secretary of
Defense certify the lack of threat for all transfers out of Guantanamo.159
Similarly, recent interest in transferring to the Secretary of Defense
authority over the Section 232 national security justification for tariffs
appears to be motivated by a desire to minimize the use of that
exception.160
Measures intended to depoliticize decisionmaking, or to advance
particular expertise, will typically allocate power downward, toward career
officials and “technocrats” within the agency, or an appointed bi-partisan
commission, rather than toward the President or his direct appointees.161
Congress’s creation of a nonpartisan commission to issue military base
closure recommendations fulfilled this purpose, by taking the political heat
off of members of Congress, who found that votes to close military bases

158 Of course, it is not always clear the extent to which members of Congress support particular
process controls for a given purpose. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (revealing the breadth of motivations and procedural causes behind
statutory drafting and the delta between knowledge among the drafters of statutes and assumptions
about congressional intent). See also, Shepsle, supra note 60.
159 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Guantanamo transfer restrictions).
160 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the multiple historical shifts in authority over the Section 232
justification, and recent attempts to shift it again).
161 See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the creation of an executive branch-based commission to
issue recommendations on military base closures).
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highly unpopular among constituents who would be affected by the loss of
jobs and resources.162
And measures to combat a lack of trust of the President—whether
based on suspicion of corruption or doubts about his judgment in a given
area—may deploy any of the above, depending on the extent to which
other actors within the executive branch inspire greater confidence. The
DETER Act bill, discussed above, is a prime example; if passed, it would
make the Director of National Intelligence (not the President) the arbiter of
whether Russia were interfering in U.S. elections, thus triggering the
sanctions in the bill.163 This would permit Congress and the country to
benefit from the expertise and access to information of the executive
branch intelligence agencies, while simultaneously taking some
decisionmaking power away from a President whose motivations in this
realm many have come to suspect. And it would do so without implicating
concerns of a so-called “deep state” seeking power at the expense of
elected leadership, because the policy objective would come from Congress
itself.
B.

Efficacy of Congressional Administration

So does congressional administration in fact influence the shape of
foreign policy decisionmaking, or is Congress just rearranging deck chairs
on a ship the president will sail in whichever direction he likes? While
administrative procedures and agency design are often held out as tools of
bureaucratic control, clear accounts of the extent to which these controls
are effective, and at producing what particular purpose, are rare.164 The few
scholars who have considered the role of specific administrative procedures
in influencing foreign policy have taken opposing views on their efficacy.165
This section considers the efficacy of process controls—and specifically
the choice of decider measures that I discuss in Section II(C)—in light of
the various purposes for which they might be deployed. This is not an
extensive survey of results. Such a study would be worthwhile though
complicated; while numerous examples exist in which process controls
correlate with a result that accords with purposes I describe above, the
reasons for a particular outcome may be overdetermined. There is the

Id.
See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the DETER Act).
164 See, e.g., Berry & Gersen, supra note 50. (using bureaucratic decisions to allocate appropriated
funds to measure the political responsiveness of agencies based on design, and finding the common
belief—that deploying political appointments throughout an agency makes them more politically
responsive—to be consistent with their results).
165 See, e.g., Mark Chinen, supra note 77, at 235 (arguing that “certification requirements are not
particularly effective in controlling executive behavior.”) But see Manners-Weber, supra note 156
(arguing that certification requirements can be effective, and that specifically, the Guantanamo
certification requirements created an obstacle to Obama closing the detention facility).
162
163
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problem of “observational equivalence” akin to that faced by scholars
seeking to demonstrate that the President makes decisions constrained by
law and not policy preferences that happen to accord with law.166
Furthermore any given process control itself may be motivated by
multiple purposes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to deduce from
understandings of the inner working of executive branch bureaucracy how
the various process controls I describe above may interact with internal
levers of decisionmaking, and thus the types of influence they are likely to
exert, and why, if not whether they will in each event result in a change of
outcome. I thus examine here the features of congressional administration
and contextual factors that are relevant to the inquiry.
1. The state of play inside the executive branch
The state of agreement or conflict inside the executive branch on a
particular matter of foreign policy or national security affects the extent to
which congressional administration can influence executive decisionmaking.
Foreign policy and national security are fields that engage many different
agencies and executive branch offices, with overlapping jurisdictions and
often conflicting mandates and biases. 167 These complexities provide
opportunities for influencing outcomes by changing decisionmaking
processes, responsibilities, and authority.
To the extent key actors on the inside are all on one page, and that page
is the President’s, there are few pressure points for members of Congress to
manipulate to do their bidding. Happily for Congress, such extreme
agreement among all components of the executive branch is rare. Often on
matters of foreign policy and national security there exist serious policy
differences, either between different agencies or personalities—or both—
and the process of decisionmaking inside the executive branch can have a
considerable effect on the outcome, in large part because that process
affects the weight afforded particular decisionmakers, and who will be the
ultimate “decider.”168 In prior work, I have discussed how triggers outside
of the executive branch can influence that process, the authority of
particular internal “deciders,” and thus help shape the ultimate outcomes.169
Congress has more power than most to influence that process, and thus,
congressional engagement to place a thumb on the scale of one side can
have a significant effect on the resulting outcome.

166 See Curt Bradley and Trevor Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint,
COLUMBIA LAW REV. (2013).
167 See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a
“They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN L. REV. 194 (2011); See also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 135.
168 See, e.g., Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts, supra note 18.
169 Id.
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For example, in the case of the Guantanamo transfer restrictions,
members of Congress had reason to believe that the Department of
Defense, and specifically the Secretary of Defense, would be more reluctant
to approve transfers than, say, the Secretary of State. The reasons for that
belief were plentiful: the Defense Secretary was the lone member of the
opposing party in the President’s national security cabinet; and the
Department of Defense was understood to harbor a significant amount of
dissent inside the building (though not universal dissent) regarding the
President’s plan to shutter the Guantanamo detention facilities.170 Members
of Congress also hoping to slow Guantanamo closure had their own
channels to actors within the Defense Department, and thus were surely
aware of internal executive branch conflict over detention questions.
Delegating the requirement to the Secretary of Defense to certify
transfers privileged the position of the Department of Defense in those
internal debates with the rest of the executive branch. And even though
President Obama signed the Act containing the certification requirements
with an accompanying signing statement questioning their
constitutionality, 171 he nevertheless continued to comply—through the
Secretary of Defense—with the reporting and certification requirements.172
The result of the certification requirement was that transfers out of
Guantanamo ground almost to a halt in the aftermath of the legislation.173
There appear to be similar dynamics at play in the context of the
Section 232 exceptions to tariff rules. Here, again, the President and some
members of his cabinet seem inclined toward action—in this case the
imposition of significant tariffs on foreign imports across the board—and
the former Defense Secretary, James Mattis, was believed to hold views
closer to that of many members of Congress, who did not want to see such
extreme tariffs imposed broadly.174 Members of Congress have had reason
to believe, in part due to his own memorandum to this effect, that the
former Secretary of Defense and later after his departure, the Department
generally, would be less inclined to certify a national security justification
for imposing tariffs than was the Secretary of Commerce, and thus they

170 See, e.g., Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51 (discussing resistance within the
Department of Defense to the President’s plan to shutter the detention facilities at Guantanamo).
171 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1568 (Dec. 23, 2011).
172 The only exception was the transfer of five Guantanamo detainees in exchange for Bowe
Bergdahl. See The May 31, 2014, Transfer of Five Senior Taliban Detainees: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 6-12 (2011) (statement of Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def.) (acknowledging that
the transfer occurred without the 30-day notice required by the statute, but stating that “[t]he
President has constitutional responsibilities and constitutional authorities to protect American
citizens and members of our armed forces.”).
173 See Manners-Webber, supra note 156, at 1424.
174 Letter from Mattis to Ross, supra note 4.
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have made a number of attempts to move the authority from the latter to
the former.
Congressional reliance on internal tensions may take a short or longview. While any given statutory designation is likely to outlast particular
appointees, who come and go quite regularly, interagency tensions are often
longstanding and survive administration to administration, and thus specific
designations may continue to operate as intended beyond the lifespan of a
particular appointee.175 Nevertheless, priorities and preferences do shift
over time, agency mandates are reorganized, and offices are brought closer
to or further from the White House from administration to administration;
thus, as with the shifting designations over Section 232 justifications for
tariffs, members of Congress may find it useful to shift agency deciders
when the current structure no longer comports with their intentions in
deploying it.
2. Process Controls: Formal or Functional Barriers?
A potential challenge to my account of process controls as an effective
means of constraining or compelling Presidential action is the argument
that executive branch actors report to the President and must do his
bidding. Designating a decider within the executive may create some
paperwork requirements, but should not—under this view—affect the
actual policy result, because that is the President’s to decide. Whether or
not this reflects the formal breakdown of power within the executive
branch (and I do not accept that it does, certainly not for all exercises of
power), it does not describe the functional reality, in which decisionmaking
power and process have a significant if not always dispositive role in the
path of policymaking.
Most of the examples of congressional administration I discuss in this
paper involve allocations of power to officials over which the President
exercises direct removal authority. Scholars differ on the extent to which
the removal power is a sufficient political control over bureaucratic
autonomy. Under Elena Kagan’s view of “Presidential Administration,”
the President’s authority implicitly extends to directing these officials to
take a particular action even if it does not accord with their own views.176
Their delegated authority is, in other words, really the President’s.177 Gary
Lawson goes several steps further, arguing that the President should have

Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51. See supra note 10.
See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2326-31 (arguing that while the Constitution does not require
that the President be able to direct all authority delegated to administrative officials, statutory
delegations to such officials, outside of independent agencies, should generally be interpreted as
“subject to the ultimate control of the President.”
177 Id.
175
176
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the power to nullify the acts of subordinates. 178 Kevin Stack takes an
opposing view, arguing that the President does not have authority to direct
subordinates in cases where statutes delegate executive power to them
specifically.179
Yet even accepting arguendo the most aggressive view of Presidential
power over subordinates’ decisions as a matter of formal authority, as a
functional matter, process and structure shapes decisionmaking and adds
hurdles, if not barriers, to the President’s ability to effectuate his preferred
policies.180 Consider one glaring example: the President’s oft-stated desire
during the first half of the Trump administration to end the Russia
investigation run first by the FBI under Jim Comey, and then by the Special
Counsel, Robert Mueller. 181 If the investigation were under his direct,
immediate control, it is probably fair to say there can be no doubt that he
would have ended or severely compromised it. But this was not within his
direct power, because the investigation was designed to be situated several
steps removed from the President by personnel if not formal authorities.182
In his efforts to end the investigation, he removed some officials, such as
FBI director James Comey, and—ultimately (though slowly)—his Attorney
General Jeff Sessions,183 and failed to remove others, such as the Deputy

178

Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1244-45

(1994).
179 Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263,
267 (2006).
180 Kagan herself acknowledges this practical reality. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2298 (“Their
resistance to or mere criticism of a directive may inflict political costs on the President as heavy as
any that would result from an exercise of the removal power. This fact of political life accounts in
part for the consultations and compromises that prefaced many of the Clinton White House’s use of
directive authority. In this context, to put the matter simply, persuasion may be more than
persuasion and command may be less than command – making the line between the two sometimes
hard to discover.”).
181
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Aug.
15,
2018),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1029731513573822464 (“The Rigged Russian Witch
Hunt goes on and on as the “originators and founders” of this scam continue to be fired and
demoted for their corrupt and illegal activity. All credibility is gone from this terrible Hoax, and
much more will be lost as it proceeds. No Collusion!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2018), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1068116413498429445
(“When will this illegal Joseph McCarthy style Witch Hunt, one that has shattered so many innocent
lives, ever end-or will it just go on forever? After wasting more than $40,000,000 (is that possible?), it
has proven only one thing-there was NO Collusion with Russia. So Ridiculous!”); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1024646945640525826 (“..This is a terrible situation
and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it
continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry
Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!”).
182 The regulations governing the special counsel do set the investigation at some remove from
the President, but as they are created by executive order and not statute, the President holds formal
authority to change them. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2018).
183 This entire paragraph will obviously need some reworking in light of recent events, but my
claim stands.
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AG, Rod Rosenstein, and Robert Mueller himself.184 Each removal had, or
was delayed by, political repercussions, despite the fact that each removal
was within his formal authority to effectuate.185 And yet he was stymied in
his efforts to end the investigation, not primarily by formal legal
constraints, though in this case there may also exist some, but by the
political hurdles of what ending the investigation would entail and
require—likely firing each official who refused to end the investigation until
he were to find someone who would. 186 Thus some officials left, but
Rosenstein remained, along with his decisions to commence and to protect
the inquiry, despite the fact that the President would not have made those
decisions himself. Wherever the formal line is drawn with respect to
presidential control over executive branch personnel, Presidential control
through appointment and removal is hardly equivalent as a functional
matter to Presidential control over the decision itself.
3. Harnessing of accountability mechanisms
One of the more effective uses of process controls is the placement of
public responsibility for a decision directly in the hands of a particular
official, who will thus understand herself to be accountable for whichever
decision she chooses going forward. When this mechanism is combined
with a legal requirement—for example to find facts, or to certify that
certain factors are met—this accountability feature raises the stakes for the
designated individual choosing whether or not to comply with the
substantive legal requirements.
Moreover, a procedural requirement is often less open to interpretation
than, say, whether a particular strike qualifies as “war,” and whether the
President can undertake it without congressional authorization. Presidents
tend to avoid actively asserting non-compliance with law, but they may

184 Mueller Report (discussing the President’s attempts to have the White House Counsel, Don
McGahn, fire Robert Mueller and thus terminate the investigation)
185 This is not to say there are no formal constraints on removal; for example, the President may
be subject to constraints on his ability to obstruct justice as a matter of law (if not one addressable by
courts at this time), which could constrain his formal authority to fire law enforcement officials for
particular purposes. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Eric Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2018) (arguing that the President may be held criminally liable for obstructing
justice through the corrupt exercise of constitutional powers); Mueller Report (stating that the
investigation was constrained by the [year] OLC memorandum that state the President cannot be
prosecuted for criminal offenses while in office).
186 It is generally understood that Nixon’s “Saturday Night Massacre” series of firings or
resignations of DOJ officials precipitated his fall. See, e.g., Ron Elving, Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre
Casts Shadow as Trump Considers Fate of DOJ Leaders, NPR (Oct. 20, 2018, 7:15 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/20/659032303/nixons-saturday-night-massacre-casts-shadow-astrump-considers-fate-of-doj-leade; Amy B. Wang, The Saturday Night Massacre: ‘Your commander in chief
has
given
you
an
order,’
WASH.
POST
(May
11,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/05/11/the-saturday-night-massacreyour-commander-in-chief-has-given-you-an-order/?utm_term=.77268fd3eadc.
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assert an interpretation that some find far-fetched.187 And the extent to
which a presidential claim is simply a different interpretation or beyond the
pale can be particularly hard to police in areas where the law is ambiguous,
fraught, or evolving. By contrast, a requirement that the Secretary of
Defense sign a piece of paper with specific language, or produce a report to
Congress, provides a much simpler metric by which to judge compliance or
non-compliance with law.
By engaging with foreign policy through process controls, Congress
enlists these internal actors themselves in its cause. It places the onus on
these individuals to decide for themselves whether to comply with or
disregard particular statutory obligations, removing their ability to hide
behind the President or behind collective action in determining whether a
statutory requirement must be followed, or whether it is a plausible
justification to dismiss the requirement as an unconstitutional
encroachment on the President. And while Presidents may be protected to
some degree from certain kinds of accountability, such as prosecution while
in office, lower-level officials have fewer protections.188 Executive branch
officials may face both hard and soft forms of personal liability for lawbreaking: from criminal prosecution in some cases, to inspector general or
GAO investigations to congressional requests and even subpoenas to
testify and explain actions taken, to disbarment or other professional
censure to public and professional embarrassment.189 As former Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta dramatically explained his record of not approving a
single transfer out of Guantanamo under the congressional certification
requirements, “that provision required that I sign my life away.”190 For
these reasons and others, executive branch officials who are designated
deciders may be more inclined than the President or unnamed groups of
advisers or officials to comply carefully with the letter of statutory
requirements.

187 See Bradley and Morrison, Presidential Power, at 1114, supra note 166 (“It is rare for Presidents
to acknowledge that they are acting inconsistently with the law. Instead, they typically argue that the
law does not require what critics are contending.”)
188 Federal government officials do enjoy some immunity for decisions they make in their
personal capacity, but they are not protected from liability for unambiguous law-breaking.
189 Soldiers, for example, must be prosecuted and punished for violating the laws of war.
Federal officials face criminal sanction for violating the anti-deficiency act. Agency Inspectors
General Offices investigate misconduct by federal employees. The GAO is an independent agency
that investigates wrongdoing on behalf of Congress. See https://www.gao.gov/about/. Congress
also frequently calls executive branch officials to testify in order to explain how their actions
comport with statutory requirements. And professional associations are often called upon to censure
the actions of professionals accused of acting unethically or otherwise outside the norms of the
profession.
190 Bruck, supra note 96.
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C.

Risks in Congressional Administration

Congressional administration does not put to bed all debates about the
allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches of the federal
government. In fact, precisely because congressional administration may
facilitate congressional involvement in areas where members might
otherwise choose to sit out, congressional influence over foreign policy
through process controls may provide the flashpoint for thorny
constitutional questions over the line between the President’s and
Congress’s authorities. Beyond these constitutional risks, there are
potential disadvantages to engaging foreign policy through congressional
administration. For example, deploying process controls may give
members of Congress a false sense of action, mollifying concerns about the
President’s policy direction or judgment and thus keeping Congress from
engaging in substantive policy debates more directly. And process controls
might at times undermine, rather than promote, accountability for
decisionmaking.
1. Constitutional Risks in Congressional Administration
Congressional administration of foreign policy and national security
raise distinct constitutional issues from the rest of the administrative state,
depending on the extent to which a given exercise of control approaches
the debated zone between the President’s delegated statutory authority and
constitutional Article II power. While some level of congressional
involvement in the design and ongoing process of executive branch
decisionmaking has a long, and executive branch-accepted, pedigree, the
executive branch has long bristled at, and often pushed back against, any
congressional engagement that interferes with, let alone “prevents,” a
“constitutionally assigned function[].”191 While “constitutionally assigned”
may be too low a bar for precluding congressional involvement, as there are
areas where the President and Congress hold concurrent power, the extent
to which the President may trump Congress in this space is a matter of hot
debate. 192 And congressional attempts to control policy through the
bureaucracy itself may raise similar constitutional dilemmas to attempts to
dictate that policy directly. Thus congressional involvement in the foreign
affairs and national security realms raises significantly thornier questions

191 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op.
O.L.C.124, 174-75 (1996) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). See
[mutliplte] signing statements.
192 See supra, note 24.
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than similar engagement with other parts of the administrative state, which
rely more exclusively on delegated authority.193
Some examples may help set the lay of the land. Certainly a
congressional attempt to constrain the President’s use of his pardon power
through, say, a requirement that the Attorney General certify that every
pardoned individual is sufficiently contrite, would be impermissible.194 The
executive branch will likewise resist process controls that executive branch
officials perceive to be interfering with the President’s ability to exercise his
commander-in-chief authority.195 Yet the extent to which that clause gives
the President plenary constitutional authority over war, concurrent
authority with Congress, or in fact very little non-delegated authority at all,
is controversial. 196 While the Constitution makes the President the
“Commander-in-Chief,” it gives to Congress not only the power to declare
war but also the power to make rules governing the armed forces.197 A
recent proposal by Richard Betts and Matthew Waxman to mandate
certification by specific internal actors, including a legal review by the
Attorney General, before the President may order the launch of a nuclear
weapon raises precisely these questions. 198 So too it is far from clear
whether the congressional requirements that the Secretary of Defense
certify Guantanamo transfers, for example, present a constitutional conflict.
President Obama suggested as much in signing statements, and even at one
point violated the statutory prohibition, but otherwise complied.199 Neither
matter would likely come before the courts, and because of the executive
branch’s general track record of compliance with such requirements, both

193 See id., at 133 n.27 (“Legislation impinging on the President’s responsibilities in the areas of
foreign affairs and national defense poses unique issues in the application of the general principle of
separation of powers, requiring a more searching examination of the validity of congressional
action.”).
194 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (The pardon “power flows from the
Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or
diminished by the Congress.”). In fact the federal regulations regulating the pardon process for the
executive branch themselves explicitly state that they are “advisory only” and do not “restrict the
authority granted to the President under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.” 28 CFR § 1.11
195 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
196 See supra Part I.A.
197 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
198 Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb: Reforming the Nuclear
Launch Process, 97 FOR. AFF. 119 (2018).
199 See Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014, 2013 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 876, at 1 (Dec. 26, 2013) (stating that “in certain
circumstances, [the transfer restrictions] would violate constitutional separation of powers
principles.”); Statement from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the return of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl
(May 31, 2014), at https://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16737; Jack
Goldsmith, The President Pretty Clearly Disregarded a Congressional Statute in Swapping GTMO
Detainees for Bergdahl, LAWFARE (June 2, 2014), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-prettyclearly-disregarded-congressional-statute-swapping-gtmo-detainees-bergdahl
(discussing
the
exchange of an American soldier for GTMO detainees, in which the Secretary of Defense did not
meet the 30-day notification requirement in the statute).
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are examples of areas where Congress might effectively rein in the
President even without necessarily running to ground the scope of their
authority to do so.
Outside of the commander-in-chief clause and the authority to appoint
and receive ambassadors, the President’s foreign policy dominance has less
clear sourcing, but the executive branch has long sought to claim and
protect it,200 often, though not always, successfully.201 Yet some areas—
such as international commerce—quite clearly lie within congressional
control, and have been ceded to the executive only through progressive
statutory delegations.202 Congress could dial back the President’s authority
in these areas entirely, and thus the fact that it intervenes through process
controls rather than through substance should not create any greater
constitutional problems than engagement with other areas of the
administrative state.
It is also worth at least briefly noting here ongoing debates in
scholarship over the extent to which Congress may direct how the
executive branch executes the law, in particular debates over the concept of
a “unitary executive.” In broad brushstrokes, unitary executive theory
holds that the President must wield all power vested in the executive
branch.203 What that means in practice, however, varies across different
versions of the theory.204 Congressional administration of the President’s
decisionmaking processes, and in particular the use of process controls to
designate and change deciders inside the executive, is in tension with more
aggressive variants.
Thus far, the courts have broadly accepted
congressional structuring of the executive branch, but I discuss these
debates here to explain how they would engage with congressional
administration of foreign policy.205

200 See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995, 1 PUB. PAPERS 807, 808 (Apr. 30, 1994) (noting that the President’s plenary power “includes
special authority in the area of foreign affairs,” and that the President will “construe” any provisions
in the legislation that would interfere with those prerogatives as “precatory.”)
201 See American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi; see also 539 U.S. 396, 414-415 (2003); Zivotofsky, 135
S. Ct. at 2084-85. For dissections of the Court’s “normalization” of its foreign policy jurisprudence,
see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, Normalization of Foreign Affairs Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897
(2015); Harlan Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 380 (2015).
202 See supra notes 105-106.
203 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
204 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 313, 313 (2010).
205 See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2250-51; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the constitutionality of independent agencies);
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, but severing as
unconstitutional the rule creating two layers of constraint on the board members’ removal).
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In its most aggressive form, a unitary executive theory might hold that
any constraints on a President’s ability to exercise executive power—
including through delegating that power to an official other than the
President—would pose an unconstitutional constraint.206 Of course, that
would mean the dismantling of most delegations of power to the agencies
making up the administrative state. The more widely held view of the
unitary executive, however, accepts the general structure of administrative
delegations to agency officials rather than to the President. 207 Most
adherents of unitary executive theory accept such delegations because they
hold the view that the way Presidential control of executive power is
effectuated is through the vesting of final decisionmaking authority in the
President or officials under his or her control by way of removal. In effect, the
argument goes, the President must hold unfettered discretion to appoint
and remove officials who wield executive power. Yet the Courts have to
date upheld Congress’s power to insulate certain agencies and officials from
presidential control. In any event, Congress has virtually never sought to
insulate the foreign policy or national security administration through such
restrictions on appointment or removal power.208
Here is where unitary executive theory could intersect with debates
about the proper allocation of foreign affairs and national security power
between the President and Congress. Might there be some distinction
between the kinds of agencies or powers Congress can insulate from
Presidential control? Could Congress insulate executive branch actors in
their exercise of powers where the President holds some concurrent
authority with Congress, such as at least some foreign policy or national
security powers? Were Congress to seek to insulate certain actors or
decisionmaking processes from presidential control in areas where the
President has traditionally asserted Article II authority, such measures could
bring questions over both the viability of unitary executive theory and the
allocation of foreign affairs power to a head.
Congressional attempts to manage the President’s foreign affairs and
national security decisionmaking therefore could provide the next
flashpoint at which each of these constitutional questions arise in the
courts. This will likely turn on how aggressively Congress seeks to deploy
process controls to establish formal buffers between the President and
executive branch decisionmakers in areas where the President has
traditionally asserted independent or even plenary authority to act.

206 Tushnet. supra at 319. Gary Lawson has argued further that the President should have the
power to nullify the acts of subordinates. See Lawson, supra note 178.
207 Id. at 315 (describing “weak” version of the unitary executive).
208 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935). One potential, though narrow, exception could involve efforts by some in Congress to
protect the Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential campaign. See,
e.g., Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, S.2644, 115th Cong.
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2. Mollification of Congress
One risk of deploying process controls is that—by giving members of
Congress a sense that they are controlling the decisionmaking process—this
may keep them from engaging further in the substance of policymaking.
And on some matters there is no substitute for direct Congressional—and
through it public—engagement with the substance of policymaking.
This phenomenon may be particularly prevalent when Congress
allocates power vertically down the hierarchy within the executive branch,
to career professionals who are expected to deploy expertise at a remove
from partisan interference. In fact, members of Congress might be more
reticent to endorse grants of power to the President—in particular to
Presidents of the opposing party—were they not assured this power would
be partly wielded (and perhaps tempered) by non-partisan professionals
within the government.209 And thus congressional delegations of this sort
should be understood as made in reliance upon existing bureaucratic
constraints.
I have previously referred to this phenomenon as
congressional “bargain[ing] in the shadow of the bureaucracy.”210
Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey nodded toward such a
phenomenon in their discussion of the reauthorization of FISA 702.211 In
response to criticism of Democratic lawmakers who voted to reauthorize
broad surveillance powers to the President while Trump held the office,
Goldsmith and Hennessey suggest that these members of Congress did so
only because of their understanding that the powers would be employed
largely by “career public servants” within agencies that “are remarkably
immune from inappropriate presidential meddling.”212 But while deference
to expertise may be reassuring, particularly in highly technical areas or in
times of high political drama, this ability to push hard decisions to apolitical
actors may also give Congress a means of abdicating its own responsibility
to promote informed and public debate.
Of course, none of this necessarily means that bureaucratic actors can
easily thwart the will of political leadership.213 A President or other political

209 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 178, at 1245 (“Judging from the political conflict that is often
generated by disputes between Congress and the President, it is at least arguable that Congress would
never have granted agencies their current, almost-limitless powers if Congress recognized that such
power had to be directly under the control of the President.”).
210 Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51, at 179-181 (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 968-69 (1979)).
211 Jack Goldsmith & Susan Hennessey, The Merits of Supporting 702 Reauthorization (Despite
Worries About Trump and the Rule of Law), LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:20AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/merits-supporting-702-reauthorization-despite-worries-about-trumpand-rule-law.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51, at 214.
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actor determined to act will often manage to do so if willing to accept the
political consequences.
And congressional administration of
decisionmaking inside the executive branch is not a holistic solution to
Presidential mismanaging of foreign relations. A President who is willing to
face the consequences of doing so can generally force the executive branch
to bend to his will. With respect to those officials who hold high-level
positions in the executive branch, like heads of departments and White
House staffers, the President may appoint whom he chooses, and he may
order officials beneath him to take, or not take, certain actions. 214 As I
discuss above, those who decide they cannot follow his orders typically
resign.215 Or the President may remove recalcitrant officials who refuse his
directions.216
There are some process answers to the above problems. If political
actors interfere with decisionmaking in a way that upends congressional
faith in the internal processes they created, members of Congress may turn
to different process controls, for example by directly requiring the
involvement of very specific actors—such as with the proposed DETER
Act.217
Ultimately, the final constraints on the President’s abuse of
congressional controls lie outside the executive branch. They are
political—such as in response to the firing of officials who insist on
following congressional requirements against the President’s will, and, to a
lesser extent, judicial—to the extent the administration refuses to engage a
reviewable statutory requirement. Both of these remedies require the other
branches to step up and engage more directly. Thus, to the extent
congressional administration pacifies Congress’s need to act and keeps it
from engaging further, this is a real threat to oversight of the executive
branch.
3. Overeager and Unwilling Deciders
Much thought about how to structure government rests on
assumptions that the players are power seeking.218 And Congress’s ability to

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Resignation letter from James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, to President Donald Trump
(Dec. 20, 2018), (available at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5656065-ResignationLetter-From-Defense-Secretary-James.html).
216 See, e.g., Evan Perez & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Fires Acting AG After She Declines to Defend
Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 31, 2017, 2:37PM) (discussing firing of Sally Yates),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/donald-trump-immigration-order-department-ofjustice/index.html; see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-32 (1934) (describing
executive removal power).
217 DETER Act, supra note 141.
218 See, e.g., William Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971)(arguing
that bureaucrats seek to maximize their power, e.g. through their budgets).
214
215
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shift power dynamics inside the executive branch creates avenues for
internal actors to, in effect, lobby Congress to give them greater
decisionmaking authority. Executive officials working with Congress to
push a legislative agenda is itself normal process; much legislation is the
result of congressional-executive wrangling, and executive branch officials
regularly seek legislation and work with counterparts in congress to
accomplish it.219 A request for changes in decision-making authority –
versus substantive policy – may be based in genuine consideration of the
best allocation of expertise and resources. It may also, however, be
deployed by internal actors who simply want greater power to gain a leg up
in interagency-conflicts through outside assistance from Congress.
But not all designations of deciders are the result of requests for more
power; and not all power is desired. Many executive officials may not
always appreciate an allocation of power in their direction.220 A designation
of decisionmaking authority, even if crafted as one of simple “fact-finding”
may put the designee in quite an awkward position vis-à-vis her boss, the
President, or other officials.221 Particularly for executive branch actors who
view their roles as engaging in fact-finding and analysis, rather than policymaking, they may view a designation as a policymaker as forcing them to
act outside of their ordinary mandate.222
That executive branch officials may not always seek or want policymaking authority runs counter to the orthodoxy that government officials
seek to aggrandize power; yet so too does Congress’s slow abdication of
power over time to the executive branch, contrary to the Madisonian ideal
of the separate branches as checking one another through their clashing

219 See, e.g., 1988 BRAC report, supra note 127 (discussing efforts by executive branch officials
to seek legislative relief from the base closure stalemate); The President’s Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control (The Grace: Commission)(1983) (proposing a nonpartisan commission to address base
closures).
220 See, e.g., James Wilson, Bureaucracy (countering the theory that agencies are “imperialistic”
with evidence that often they do not seek or even seek to avoid increases in budget or power).
221 Several Defense Secretaries responsible for certifying the Guantanamo transfers have
discussed the awkward position this placed them in, required by law to make a public certification for
which they would bear responsibility, and yet facing a President who had made Guantanamo closure
a signature promise. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2012 and
the Future Years Defense Program: Hearings on S. 1253 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong. 49
(2011) (statement of Robert Gates, Sec’y of Def.) (testifying that the Congressional certification
requirements had put him in an “uncomfortable position of having to certify people who get
returned”); Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed To Close Guantanamo, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 1,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-closeguantanamo (quoting former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel discussing the “immense pressure”
he felt from the President, as against the sentiment in DOD that there should be an extremely high
bar to release).
222 Intelligence analysts, in particular, view the role of their offices as providing information and
analysis, and often seek to avoid a suggestion that they might be crafting policy. This makes the
proposal in the DETER Act, which would make a major policy decision—here a sanctions regime—
turn on the word of an intelligence agency—here ODNI—unusual.
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hungers for power.223 And yet here we are. Government actors do not
always find that more responsibility, or more power, is necessarily in their
self interest.224 Whether imposing on these officials despite their reticence
is in the public interest, however, is another question. In at least some of
these cases, it is worth considering that officials given roles that they deem
to fall outside of their mandate, expertise, or competence may actually be
right about their mandate, expertise, or competence (or at least the latter
two, as the first will inevitably shift with the new responsibility).
Designations of such officials under such circumstances would seem to
follow from a breakdown in process or a lack of viable alternatives—such
as a widespread mistrust of the other available officials or the President—in
which case Congress might be better suited to making the decision itself
than delegating it to the executive branch at all.
4. Surreptitious Interference with Political Will
Presidents, much more so than members of Congress, campaign on
foreign policy promises. And there is an expectation on the part of the
public that they will seek to carry out these promises. Congressional
administration may at times permit Congress to stymie presidential
prerogatives without necessarily doing so openly and entailing the political
cost of directly challenging the President’s stated policies through
substantive legislation. For example, President Obama campaigned on
closing the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.225 Once he
began the process of doing so in office, congressional opposition to the
plan swelled.226 Yet rather than directly legislate that Guantanamo be kept
open, or prohibit transfers entirely, Congress chose to influence the course
of Guantanamo closure through less transparent means, by altering the
transfer decisionmaking process. By so doing, Congress was able to play a
large role in upending the President’s closure agenda, for which he might
have reasonably argued he had a public mandate to accomplish.227 Because
he, and not Congress, bore the brunt of that failed campaign promise,
members of Congress who opposed the President politically had political
incentives to upset his policies generally, regardless of their belief in the
ideal policy outcome, and particularly so if they could do so with few costs.
In the case of Guantanamo, it is possible that members of Congress who

223 THE FEDERALIST: No. 51 (James Madison) (“Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.”).
224 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 152.
225
Barack
Obama:
The
War
We
Need
to
Win, OBAMA ’08 (2007),
https://obama.3cdn.net/417b7e6036dd852384_luzxmvl09.pdf.
226 Charlie Savage, Closing Guantánamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/26gitmo.html.
227 Manners-Webber, supra note 156. (“On the date President Obama signed the first NDAA
containing a certification requirements . . . there were eighty-nine men waiting on the recommendedfor-transfer list. For nearly three years, not one would be approved for transfer.”).
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supported the process controls would have supported more significant
substantive measures as well, but it is impossible to know whether there
would have been any political costs borne in that alternative universe. And
because the costs to supporting process controls are so low, congressional
administration could potentially lead to substantive results that neither the
President nor members of Congress who vote for the control measures
would support—or would want to be seen supporting—if required to do so
directly.
5. Risks to Accountability and Transparency
Finally, and to my view most significantly, congressional influence
through process controls in lieu of direct substantive engagement with
policy can at times weaken, rather than augment, accountability and
transparency in foreign policy decisionmaking. In fact, the very same
political advantages that members of Congress may seek in deploying
indirect mechanisms of influence rather than more direct forms of policymaking come hand and hand with concomitant disadvantages to
transparency and accountability. The extent to which a given control
weakens or strengthens accountability and transparency of decisionmaking
depends on the particular control at issue, how it functions, and the
plausible alternatives against which it might be measured.
Arguably, the Constitution allocates to Congress certain powers, such as
the power to declare war, or to regulate international commerce, at least in
part because the framers wanted certain types of decisions to be made
within the context of heavy public debate, by the branch most closely
accountable to the public.228 Yet in contrast to the substantive control by
Congress of the merits of a particular policy objective, congressional
attempts to influence policy by manipulating the inner workings of the
executive branch, and specifically by designating as the decisionmakers its
politically-insulated bureaucrats, entail significantly less transparency or
direct accountability for the substantive positions taken. This is not to say
that Congress itself is somehow legislating in secret; its enactment of
legislative process controls itself is as transparent as would be substantive
legislation. But it is the subsequent process of substantive decisionmaking
by actors inside the executive branch that is more shielded from public
view or voters’ control. In fact, that lack of political accountability is often
the point: whether out of a belief that the decision is better made by
technocrats without partisan political influence, or because members of
Congress want to shield themselves from political costs, or both, Congress
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often deploys process controls in lieu of substance specifically because it sets
the substantive decision apart from political accountability.229
The extent to which a given process control engages more or less
accountability, however, depends on the nature of the control itself, and on
the baseline against which it is judged. Process controls may be deployed
specifically to raise a decision from the ranks of unknown bureaucratic
actors to a designated high-level official. Such was the case with the
Guantanamo certification requirements, in which case Congress’s choice of
process control took the decisionmaking authority over transfers from an
unnamed panel of bureaucrats who issued determinations as a group, and
handed it to a not overjoyed Secretary of Defense for his personal
signoff.230 In comparison to members of Congress, or the President, the
unelected Secretary of Defense is less accountable, and certainly does not
face the voters’ wrath directly unless he later decides to run for elected
office. But as compared to decisionmaking by a group of faceless
bureaucrats, there is more transparency in the decision when made by a
named high-level official such as the Secretary of Defense. The many
accounts by former Secretaries of Defense who reported finding these
requirements to be a significant, painful burden supports the intuition that
the direct designation of a decisionmaker does create a sense of
accountability for one’s decisions.231 As this example demonstrates, the
specific function the process control implements, and the baseline against
which it operates, are both critical factors in determine the extent to which
a given process control aids or weakens accountability.
Moreover, weighing congressional administration against more direct
substantive congressional engagement is not necessarily a fair comparison.
An alternative universe in which Congress legislates substance up to the
extent of its formal authorities might be one in which foreign policy is more
accountable to public opinion (putting aside for the moment whether that
would be a normatively desirable outcome). But considering Congress’s
historical trajectory at this point, it is not a realistic one.232 Therefore, while
it is wise to compare the accountability effect of different types of process
controls as against one another, it is not typically realistic to compare them
to direct substantive congressional engagement.

See e.g., infra Part II.C.1 (discussing military base closures).
See infra Part III.C.1.
231 See, e.g., Manners-Weber, supra note 156 (arguing that “[b]y localizing accountability in a
single person, certification requirements concentrate risk in that person. Personal responsibility
brings personal vulnerability. Moreover, these certifications must be memorialized in writing,
heightening the vulnerability: should things go wrong, there is a clear record both of the certifier’s
responsibility and of her poor judgment. This vulnerability changes the certifier’s overall decisionmaking calculus; under the right set of factors, the decisionmaker may become unwilling to make a
decision that she would have made otherwise.”).
232 See infra Part I.
229
230
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Counter-intuitively, the duly elected President is not necessarily a more
accountable “designated decider” than would be a specific named official in
his cabinet. While designating the President as decider might formally
appear to place the reins in more publicly-accountable hands, the functional
reality is that President-as-designee does not effectuate the same personal
accountability features that would any-other-named-official-as-designee.
This is so for several reasons, among them the fact that the President will
be held vaguely accountable for all decisions emanating from his term in
office, whether within or not within his control, and the sheer enormity
may tend to swallow up any given decision.233 But more importantly for
our purposes, presidential decisions and pronouncements are often the
result of processes that take place far below his radar, via group
decisionmaking by unnamed officials, whom the President and her
subordinates will often designate and task secretly.234 Thus, neither direct
congressional engagement with substance nor direct decisions by the
President are, as a realistic matter, necessarily more “accountable” options
against which to measure congressional administration. Instead, specific
process controls, decisionmaking processes, and their distinct implications
must be weighed against each other, and against a realistic assessment of
the plausible alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Congressional administration of executive branch decisionmaking
provides a means for Congress to move past the impasses that often hinder
direct congressional action in the foreign affairs and national security space.
The process controls I discuss in this Article permit members of Congress
to advance policy preferences, push back against a President whose policies
they mistrust, or resolve politically fraught quandaries by placing them in
the hands of experts, without many of the policy and political risks that
often get in the way of substantive legislation. And yet, despite their
salience, the influence of process controls on the foreign policy and
national security decisionmaking process is often absent from debates
about the allocation of these powers between the President and Congress.

233.See “The Buck Stops Here” Desk Sign, Harry S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM
(available at: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm) (discussing Truman’s oft-stated motto,
“the buck stops here,” meaning “the President—whoever he is—has to decide. He can’t pass the
buck to anybody.”). But c.f. REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP BEFORE MARINE ONE DEPARTURE,
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 10, 2019) (available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-30/) (In which President Trump states,
“the buck stops with everybody” in response to the question, “does the buck stop with you over this
shutdown?”).
234 Even when the President creates processes publicly, through, e.g., Executive Order, the
specific officials are often unnamed. See Exec. Order 13567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011).
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The use of process controls to designate deciders within the executive
branch is particularly effective when it exploits known tensions, which
provides opportunities for Congress to influence policies through strategic
use of pressure points on the internal decisional process. Congress—and
the Courts, as I will discuss in a future paper—might employ this
mechanism of oversight even more instrumentally as a means of playing a
more significant role in national security and foreign relations without
necessarily infringing on the executive’s comparative advantages of speed,
expertise, and knowledge, or undermining the United States’ “one voice” in
foreign affairs.
Process controls are not a panacea, and they are not without risk.
Indirect legislation of process is not always superior to direct substantive
legislation, and the existence of this half measure may at times prevent
Congress from taking more direct action. Moreover, process controls entail
certain risks—to efficient decisionmaking, to accountability, and to public
engagement with foreign affairs and national security decisions. Choosing
the proper control requires consideration of context, purpose, and the state
of play inside the executive branch.
Nevertheless, process controls offer three critical advantages to direct
substantive legislation. First, they provide a means for members of
Congress to influence policy without necessarily incurring the political costs
that often keep them from engaging. Thus, to the extent congressional
involvement is important, process controls may often be the only game in
town. Second, process controls may be more effective than direct
mandating of policy, as they act through the commandeering of officials
inside the executive branch, often before decisions even reach the
President, rather than through direct interbranch conflict, which the
President may be more inclined to thwart. And finally, process controls
provide a means of Congressional influence on policy while still benefiting
from the executive branch advantages of information, expertise, and
dispatch. Ultimately, process controls can be an important tool Congress
may and should deploy to push back against the President, giving that
branch some concrete means to complement the President’s creeping
claims to unilateral power in the foreign affairs and national security
spheres.
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